Tag Archives: Ken Lay

Enron’s Unfair Trial

This letter to the editor of the Chicago Tribune is so encouraging I can barely sit still. I have perceived a change in the public’s feelings about Jeff Skilling and Dr. Lay over the last few years. Letters like this only solidify my belief that since some of the facts about Enron have been exposed, more people are noticing that Skilling and Lay were not guilty.

Phil Rosenthal’s column about the failure of Enron (Business, Dec. 4) missed out on several interesting points in law and economics.

First and foremost, Jeffrey Skilling and Ken Lay were convicted of wire fraud even though they had no personal gain from the fraud. The Supreme Court later unanimously found the “honest services” version of fraud was too vague and ruled only bribes and kickbacks are illegal.

By contrast, Andrew Fastow, then chief financial officer of Enron, established the off-book entities where much of Enron’s debt was parked. To be legal, the off-balance-sheet special purpose entities were supposed to be independent of Enron. But Fastow did not let this happen. Indeed, he siphoned off tens of millions of dollars to his personal account by virtue of being an officer of both the partnerships and Enron.

Fastow initially indicated to the FBI that the lack of independence was not reported to Skilling. Fastow later testified just the opposite. The earlier, exculpatory testimony was kept from the defense by both the prosecution and trial Judge Sim Lake.

Skilling was convicted on only one count of insider trading out of ten charges in the indictment. According to courtroom observers, the prosecution won conviction because the trading occurred after Sept. 11, 2001, and therefore it was seen as “unpatriotic.”

Perhaps the most egregious error in the Enron case was the denial of a change of venue. Passions in Houston were running high, with so many residents and their friends having been personally affected with Enron’s collapse. In the opinion of Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who cannot be considered a conservative, the jury pool was most likely biased.

– Paul Fisher and Jim Johnston, directors, Heartland Institute, Chicago

Those of us who know Jeff Skilling is innocent might be a minority, but eventually our view will be justified. I am certain of this.

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Enron Executives Were Underpaid

The (Canadian) Globe and Mail launches a screed about executive pay thusly:

Bosses – are they worth it? A series of corporate-world disasters over the past decade – the internet bubble, Enron, banks – suggests that a lot of executives are overrated.

Enron is never mentioned again in the article so we don’t know what proof she has to support her position that Enron’s compensation was proof that executives are overpaid. However, I’ll take a stab at talking about Enron executives’ pay.

First, if you have a problem with executives’ compensation, take it up with Towers Pirren, a consulting firm with whom Enron devised its pay packages. Like everything Enron did, auditors and lawyers were circling like hawks. Enron, in its zeal to be transparent, loved to spend money on outsiders and advisers. McKinsey, Arthur Andersen, and Vinson and Elkins all advised Enron. Of course the company would outsource the pay packages.

In a 1999 proxy statement, Enron’s board said its goal was to set executive pay in the 75th percentile of its peer group. It’s not completely clear whom the board included among its peers. It did not expressly list its peers, but did compare itself to Duke Energy, Dynegy and PG&E to assess overall corporate performance.

Thus it is difficult to know if Enron executives were objectively overpaid. Were I to design a study on the situation, I would define Enron’s peers as those alike in market cap, number of employees, and income, then try and figure out what they were paying. The companies listed above were smaller than Enron; I would not be surprised to learn Enron paid more than them because Enron was not a peer.

In its proxy statements, Enron’s board said its “key performance criteria” for executive compensation included, “funds flow, return on equity, debt reduction, earnings per share improvements and other relevant factors.”

By these benchmarks, Enron’s executives did well. Between 1996 and 2000, revenue increased to $100.8 billion from $13.3 billion. Enron’s earnings per share grew to $1.22 from $1.12. Reported earnings climbed to $979 million from $584 million.

The compensation of the top-earning five Enron executives (Ken Lay, Jeff Skilling, Stanley Horton, Mark Frevert, Ken Rice) was inexorably tied to the health of the company. See for yourself:

Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
         
Top Five Executive Salaries $3.04 $3.13 $3.62 $3.80 $3.61
Top Five Bonus Payments 4.70 1.85 9.46 11.30 17.55
Top Five Stock Grants 29.71 62.51 54.74 81.40 85.61
Top Five Total Compensation 37.46 67.48 67.82 96.50 107.67

Eighty percent of their compensation was stock. Their livelihoods depended on that stock. The best interest of the company was their own best interest – which is how it should work. Compensating executives with stock is supposed to cement allegiance to the company, keeping them there for a long time (thus the vesting scheme) and doing their best to keep the stock price high.

Between 1996 and 2000, the average chief executive salary and bonus increased by 24% to $1.72 million, according to a Forbes study. Total CEO compensation, including stock options and restricted stock grants, grew 166% to an average of $7.43 million. But look what the top five Enron execs were making.

Their salaries grew only 2.6% from 1996 to 2000. Their bonus payments grew 16.55% from 1996 to 2000. These two figures are well below their peers’ compensation. Their stock grants grew by 85.51% in the same time period – again, below their peers’ 166% figure. At the same time, Enron’s reported earrings grew 97% and revenue increased 99.8%.

That is what you call an argument that Enron’s execs were underpaid.

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Today In Enron History

Saturday, October 27, 2001

Chuck Watson met with Ken Lay at Lay’s family home. The two business leaders began to discuss the nuts and bolts of a potential merger. Dynegy didn’t want Enron’s international unit — except it would take the London trading operation. Everything else would strictly be in North America.

The company’s name? Ken Lay proposed “Enron-Dynegy”. Watson flatly refused, stating that the name Enron had become poison. If the merger would happen, it would just be Dynegy, and Watson would run it while Ken Lay would be a board member. And as for management, only Greg Whalley was welcome at Dynegy.

As for price, the opening salvo was for Dynegy to buy Enron at current market price with no added value for shareholders.

This took Ken Lay aback. The stock closed at $15.04 on Friday – and had been at over $90. Ken Lay stated that the reason the stock was zooming downward was because of short sellers and the media. The value was there – it just wasn’t being reflected in the share price.

But even if Watson wouldn’t go for it, Ken Lay knew that this had to happen fast. The company was evaporating before his very eyes. The power dynamic had shifted so dramatically. Just months ago, Enron was the biggest, baddest company in Houston. Now it was asking smaller companies for favors.

Later that day, Rick Causey met with some Anderson accountants at his office. David Duncan, Tom Bauer, and Deb Cash were given a quick presentation on Chewco. Causey described the issue with Michael Kopper’s lover, an issue that had arisen with Barclay’s (the company’s investment looked like a loan; it wasn’t, but it looked like it) and the fact that distributions were sent to Andy Fastow’s wife. Maybe troubling, but was it legal? There was still no dramatic conclusion.

And the lawyers arrived. Two partners from Weil, Gotshal’s Dallas office were shown around the trading floor. The trading guys, who were known for aggression, were determined to survive even if the rest of the company collapsed. They were not going down without a fight. Mark Haedicke, lawyer for the trading division, was the main contact for the Weil, Gotshal attorneys. Finally the went into a conference room to meet with Jeff McMahon, Greg Whalley, and some of the trading team. Ideas were tossed around. They could borrow against assets. But all the international assets were under water. They could get a private equity fund to throw some money at the trading division. They could borrow against the pipelines.

The beautiful, sleek, perfect pipelines. The assets at Enron’s foundation, the assets that brought in hundreds of millions of dollars every year. The core of Enron. Maybe, to the outside world, some value was still locked in those.

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Today In Enron History

Friday, October 26, 2001.

The stock opened at $16 and would close at $15.40 – a loss of only 5.81% of its value. Nothing to cheer about, certainly, but when compared to the losses every day of the week, it was one of the better days.

The morning was surreal. Overnight there had been a terror threat on the Enron building so when workers got to 1400 Smith Street, they found the surrounding avenues blocked off and police everywhere. Of course, it was a false alarm but it certainly was an external representation of how everyone was feeling inside. Like things were about to go boom.

Ben Glisan was at his desk early, researching Chewco. After the WSJ published a lurid exposé the previous day, it was essential to get a handle on the deal.

From 10 to 11, Ken Lay was on the phone with Deloitte and Touche. At noon he attended an Enron board meeting, in which Glisan gave a presentation on everything he knew about Chewco.

One of the executives present at the meeting, Rodney Faldyn, didn’t like the sound of Chewco. He went to see Rick Causey and told him he felt like there might be a problem with it.

A few hours later, Faldyn and Ryan Siurek called Tom Bauer at Arthur Andersen and asked for clarification about the three percent rule. Bauer explained that three percent of an off the books partnership had to come from an independent investor in order for the partnership to be valid and comply with accounting rules.

Faldyn believed then that Chewco did not meet that standard.

Chewco had been used to buy Calper’s interest in JEDI. JEDI spun off a lot of cash – there had never been any question about the JEDI deals. But if Chewco wasn’t independent, that meant that JEDI wasn’t either, and all the income reported on every income statement, every balance sheet, every bit of information that had exited the Enron building would have been wrong, all the way back to 1997.

Ben Glisan, Rick Causey, and Rodney Faldyn met to discuss Chewco. And thus Enron was confronted with the strangest question ever to face any company anywhere: How do federal accounting laws view homosexuality?

(I need to interrupt myself to say I feel really weird talking about about Kopper’s sexuality. You don’t hear me talking about anyone else’s lover – just Kopper’s – and it’s because he’s gay. It shouldn’t be any big deal. So though I’m talking about Kopper’s love life [a place I have no business being] please know I’m really only trying to explain what was happening. I’m not singling him out or anything like that. I’m not going to discuss the sex lives on any other Enron execs. You can take that to the bank.)

If Kopper’s lover had been his lawfully wedded spouse, the whole deal would have violated accounting rules because the capital would not have come from an independent party. But Kopper wasn’t married. In the eyes of the state of Texas and the US Government, he was a single man, and his “friend” could invest whatever the heck he wanted. But he was Kopper’s live in lover. So was his investment independent or not?

Ken Lay must have felt a lead weight in his chest when he picked up the phone to call the Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan. High-flying Enron needed help, and Ken Lay probably never thought he’d see the day. He told Greenspan that Enron was having problems with its trading partners and cash was drying up. He did not ask for a bailout. He would have no doubt taken one, but he didn’t ask for one. Greenspan said he would monitor the situation. Ken Lay then put in a few other calls to his well-placed Washington friends.

After the call, he had a meeting with James Derrick (general counsel) and Rick Causey. Rick told him that they were still looking at Chewco, they hadn’t drawn any conclusions, but it looked like there might be a very serious problem with it.

That night the Enron 401(k) plan was locked down. After months of friendly reminders, Enron employees could not touch their accounts until November.

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Today In Enron History

October 25, 2001

The stock opened at $16.40. It would close at $16.35. Enron’s stock would never close higher than it opened again, not even on the day the Dynegy deal was announced, and the October 25 loss would be one of the smallest ones Enron would know from here on out.

Steve Bergstrom, president of Dynegy, was like most oil and gas execs in Houston: he knew everyone. One of his friends was Stan Horton, CEO of Enron Transportation Services, which was basically Enron’s pipelines. Horton called Bergstrom and asked him to meet for lunch, and added that he’d like Greg Walley and Mark Frevert who was CEO of Enron Wholesale, to join them.

Bergstrom had floated the idea of combining Enron’s European trading ops with Dynegy’s and since both Whalley and Frevert were coming from trading backgrounds, it looked to Bergstrom like maybe Enron was coming around to that idea in light of the crisis.

They met at the Plaza Club at One Shell Plaza. On the forty-ninth floor, it has an astonishing view of Houston (speaking from experience, especially at night). Whalley gave it to him straight: they wanted to discuss a merger. With the whole company. Not just European ops.

Bergstrom, taken aback, was certainly open the idea. He said he needed to talk to Ken Lay directly. Whalley said that was no problem. A few hours later, Ken Lay got in touch with CEO Chuck Watson. They made an appointment to meet on Saturday at Ken Lay’s home.

Meanwhile, Enron had announced its plan to draw down its $3 billion in bank lines. The WSJ was all over that. They called Mark Palmer and during that conversation casually mentioned Chewco — what was that? Palmer said he had no idea.

Rebecca Smith and John Emshwiller had found the name in an LJM private placement document. Since Enron was in the throes of a crisis, they knew that they could get their names out there if they found a new controversy so they were attempting to find an angle nobody else had found yet. Chewco, it turned out, was that angle.

The article reads in part:

While Enron disclosed its Fastow-related transactions in SEC filings, a computerized search of the SEC’s database of public filings produced no reference to this other employee-related entity known as Chewco.

Chewco was established in 1997 “with approximately $400 million in capital commitments” to buy an interest in Enron assets, according to one of the partnerships documents. The document didn’t further specify what assets were purchased, and it didn’t disclose the financial impact of the transactions for either Chewco or Enron. Chewco was being run by Michael Kopper, a managing director in Enron’s Global Equity Markets Group, according to the document.

Enron, which has maintained that its complex financial transactions with employee-related entities were legal and properly disclosed, didn’t have any comment regarding its dealings with Chewco.

Mr. Kopper, who Enron says left the company this year to focus on helping to run the Fastow-related partnerships, didn’t return phone calls. A person at his office in Houston Thursday said Mr. Kopper was traveling. In response to questions about Chewco, an Enron spokesman would say only that “Michael Kopper was never an executive officer of Enron.” Mr. Fastow repeatedly has declined interview requests. He severed his relationships with the partnerships in July.

This statement is an apparent reference to SEC disclosure regulations regarding related-party transactions. Under SEC rule S-K, a company has to report any transaction that exceeds $60,000 and involves “any director or executive officer.” By contrast, Mr. Fastow, as CFO, would have fallen into that category, but Mr. Kopper, as managing director of a business unit, presumably wouldn’t have.

However, reporting guidance issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board seems to have a broader definition, one that might include Mr. Kopper. According to FAS Statement 57, a related-party transaction involves a “material” piece of business between the company and a member of management. The statement defines management as directors, top officers, vice presidents in charge of major business units and “other persons who perform similar policy-making functions. Persons without formal titles may also be members of management.”

All that stuff about Michael Kopper is a transparent effort to cause trouble. Classic muckraking.

Inside Enron, Mark Palmer was trying to get some answers about Chewco so he could talk to Smith and Emshwiller about it. He wasn’t able to get good answers so he called a meeting with McMahon, Greg Whalley and a few others. Ken Lay got pulled in and basically everyone tried to cobble together what they knew about Chewco. Jeff McMahon mentioned that an issue was Michael Kopper’s partner was chief investor in the fund.

Ken Lay was confused. “He has another partner in this?”

“Um.. No,” McMahon said. “His.. lover. Michael Kopper’s gay lover.”

Ken Lay finally lost his composure. “What the fuck is happening here!?” he yelled.

The pressure Jeff McMahon was under during this time must have been otherworldly. He was working nonstop to keep the company afloat. Drawing down the bank lines was slated for that day, and the New York bankers weren’t happy about it. No bank had thought that Enron would draw down over $3 billion in one giant gulp. They didn’t want to send it. McMahon was a bulldog. “Send it,” he said.

“But … but.”

“Send it.”

Meanwhile, Andy Fastow, newly fired, spent the day on the phone with attorneys. From 11am to 1:30pm he was on a conference call with Michael Rubenstien, David Gerger, and Lea. Then from 1:30 to 3:00 he was on the phone with Gerger alone. Then at 5:30 he spoke to Gerger again for thirty minutes.

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Today In Enron History

Tuesday, October 23, 2001.

The stock opened at $23.25, its high for the day.

Ken Lay convened a conference call with analysts to try and keep them apprised of what was happening ( Call transcript here ). The room at the Enron building was packed; Ron Astin, a V&E attorney, was present, as were Richard Causey, Ben Glisan, Greg Whalley, Mark Palmer, Andy Fastow. Tension zinged through the room. The only thing Whalley could say was that an SEC investigation had begun but he could give no other details, which was the only thing that the world wanted to know. Causey was uncomfortable; Fastow was angry.

Most of the analysts were polite, until Richard Grubman took the line. Only a few months earlier, Jeff Skilling had called the Highfields Capital short seller an asshole ( transcript here). Grubman asked a question about Azurix, saying that the water company would require a billion dollars of support from Enron, and had Enron taken reserves against that liability?

Causey answered that Azurix was well-positioned to handle all of its obligations. Grubman persisted, stating that the value just wasn’t there.

Ken Lay stepped in. “Richard… I know you want to drive the stock price down. And you’ve done a good job of doing that, but let’s move on to the next question.”

Lay and Grubman tangled for a few more moments.

Listening from home, Jeff Skilling must have been smugly satisfied. That guy was a pill, and it was difficult for even consummately professional Lay to gracefully handle him.

David Duncan had been watching the stock price during the conversation. It was chugging downward with every second.

An analyst from Goldman Sachs finally got to the question everyone wanted answered – whether there was more to come in terms of LJM. Ken Lay said that he couldn’t say much about LJM because of the SEC investigation.

Skilling thought this was exactly the wrong answer. This was what people wanted to know – the one question that had the potential to turn around the stock price and people’s perception of Enron, and Lay refused to answer it.

That was when Skilling called Enron. Lay was still on the call, but Skilling asked his secretary to have him call back asap.

When the call ended, the general feeling in the room was that they’d just created another disaster. A huge, ugly, nasty disaster.

Shutting off the webcast in his office, David Duncan reiterated the document policy and told his team to get in compliance with it.

When he was finished with the analyst call, Ken Lay called Skilling. Skilling asked to be brought back to Enron. He believed it would send a good signal to the street and help tourniquet the blood loss the company was experiencing. Ken Lay said he’d think about it.

A little while later, Ken Lay headed to the Imperial Ballroom of the Hyatt for an all-employee meeting ( Transcript here). The employees were worried about the stock price; many were angry. Ken Lay was calm and affable, as always, and assured them that the stock was way undervalued.

The employees had been asked to provide questions anonymously to Mr. Lay. Most of them were concerns about the stock price and what the company’s strategy would be going forward. Then he picked up a question written on a card and said, “A lot of these I think I’m going to have to handle, like this one.” He read: “I would like to know if you are on crack.”

The crowd laughed.

“If so,” he continued, “that would explain a lot. If not, you may want to start because it is going to be a long time before we can trust you again.”

The crowd laughed again. Even under attack, Dr. Lay looked relaxed and appeared to be enjoying himself, though we know that could not possibly be happening.

“I think that’s not a very happy employee,” Lay said. “I’m sure a lot of you have some hatred.” He paused. “No, I’m not on crack.”

The decision of the board to ask Andy Fastow how much he had earned with the LJM structures had been made last week. Today John Duncan and Mickey LaMaistre would ask. Jim Derrick, the firm’s general counsel, had composed a script (script here) to make sure they asked the right questions.

LaMaistre, who was in Colorado at the time, looked down at the script and began to read it.

“Andy, because of the current controversy surrounding LJM1 and LJM2, we believe it would be helpful for the board to have a general understanding of the amount of your investment and your return on investment in the LJM entities.” He asked four specific questions, which allowed for no wiggle room.

Fastow answered that he made twenty-three million on LJM1 and twenty-two million on LJM2. The actual number would be about fifteen million dollars higher — over sixty million dollars all told.

In Global Finance, two very bad things were happening. The first was that Enron’s short term loans in the commercial paper market weren’t rolling over. The second was that Ben Glisan was attempting to get some credit from bankers, to no avail. No bank wanted to do business with Enron as long as Fastow was still CFO. Thus Ben Glisan was put in the uncomfortable position of having to tell his boss that he was the corporate equivalent of anthrax.

Pug Winokur, a board member, and president Greg Whalley were at that moment fighting over whether Andy Fastow would stay as CFO. The board – and Pug – adored Andy. Whalley believed Fastow was poison.

Fastow and Glisan convened the finance team – including Rick Causey – trying to find a way out of the morass of problems that had been dumped on their laps. Whalley suggested they call Jeff McMahon.

McMahon and Glisan were not on good terms. Just three days earlier McMahon had tried to fire Glisan. But the Boy Scout had survived. So when Glisan told him that the company was unable to roll commercial paper, McMahon could only roll his eyes. Obviously Glisan was too stupid to even know the words he was using.

“Ben, obviously you didn’t mean you couldn’t roll it,” McMahon said. Probably what had happened was that he couldn’t issue as much as the company would like, which was not a surprise in this market.

Then Andy’s voice came on the line. “No, Jeff. Ben is right. We were unable to find any buyers for our commercial paper.”

McMahon was stunned. And sickened. Through the astonishment of the situation, only one solution presented itself. It was time to draw down the revolving credit lines that backed the commercial paper.

Getting off the phone with Glisan, Causey and Fastow, McMahon then called Whalley. “We have a major liquidity crisis,” he said.

The stock closed at $19.79, a loss of 4 percent of its value.

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Today In Enron History

Monday, October 22, 2001.

The stock opened at the high it would reach for the day: $24.

The SEC alerted the company that it had begun an investigation; it was not entirely unexpected since the Wall Street Journal had spent almost the entire previous week raising questions and accusing Enron of covering up the $1.6 billion loss. Questions had begun to swirl, and accusations. So when it finally happened, there was something almost inevitable about it. ( Press release here).

At 8am Ken Lay convened a meeting of Enron’s executives in the Dogwood room of the Hyatt Regency across the street from the Enron towers. Absent was Andy Fastow, who was currently meeting with Jordan Mintz in Fastow’s office. Ken Lay had asked him not to attend.

There was a lot to discuss: LJM, the write-downs, the SEC inquiry, the sinking stock. Ken Lay’s hope was that by having a very frank discussion, he might calm the company – and possibly come up with a short-term strategy that would halt the kamikaze death spiral that Enron was in.

Almost immediately, the meeting was bedlam, a scene out of the English parliament with executives yelling in the middle of the other’s questions and comments. Some believed the company should apologize and vow to do a better job of disclosure. Others yelled back that was nonsense, that taking a defensive posture was absolutely the wrong thing to do.

Ken Lay reiterated his support (and the Board’s) for Andy Fastow. In the end, nothing was really solved by this meeting, but at least it must have been crystal clear to Ken Lay that with so many executives calling for Fastow’s neck, he could not remain CFO for long. In fact, he had two more days in that role.

At 10:30 Andy Fastow called Mike Edsall, an attorney at Kirkland & Ellis, LJM’s outside counsel. They spoke for half an hour.

From 12:30 to 2pm, he met with Houston attorney David Gerger- who would become his attorney through-out the Enron trials. One can speculate what was going on here, but I’ll just assume he was eager to catch up with an old friend. (Gerger was a friend of Lea Fastow).

At 3pm, Ken Lay hosted a special Board of Directors meeting, which Ken Lay again asked Andy Fastow not to attend. Ben Glisan made a presentation, noting that demand for the company’s bonds was soft, but restating that Enron had plenty of liquidity. After a brief discussion with Rick Causey about an arcane accounting structure of Azurix, Ken Lay asked if any of the Board members if they knew how much money Andy had made from the LJM structures. Nobody knew. The time had come to just ask him. Two directors, John Duncan and Mickey LeMaistre were appointed to call Fastow and ask him.

At 3:30pm Houston time, Enron stock closed at $20.65, having lost 20.7% of its value since Friday.

At 4pm, Fastow had another phone conversation with Mike Edsall lasting for one hour.

At 5pm, Fastow attended a strategy meeting to prepare for the next day’s special investor conference call. In attendance were Ken Lay, Greg Whalley, Mark Koenig, Rick Causey, Steve Kean, and Ben Glisan.

At 6pm, the meeting broke up and most of the executives left for the annual fundraiser at the Holocaust Museum, which was also an occasion to honor Jim Reilly of Salomon Smith Barney. Andy Fastow, having been offered a chance to speak about his contribution to the museum, took a special moment to acknowledge Ken and Linda Lay, saying that the couple were Lea and his own personal role models and paragons of community service. Though I do not know this, I think it is reasonable to assume that Andy knew at this point that the walls were closing in. He’d been locked out of two critical meetings that day. He was on the phone with lawyers. He wasn’t stupid. Putting those three factors together, it not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that he definitely knew something was very wrong. I believe his rather slobbery display over the Lays that evening was an attempt to charm and woo Ken back into his corner. Ken had always adored Andy — I think Andy was trying to remind him of that.

That night, about the time everyone was driving home from the gala, an automated email went out to all Enron employees reminding them that the Enron Savings Plan was moving to a new administrator, and that October 26 would be the last day they could touch their funds until November 20.

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Enron and “A New America”

This Forbes article, written just after the collapse on January 28, 2002, reads like a quaint artifact. The last two paragraphs were particularly poignant:

Enron didn’t get everything it wanted, he says and, at least in the field of energy deregulation, there were powerful forces, such as local utilities, arrayed against it. Enron “wanted to change all the rules really, really quickly and make a new America,” Pierce says.

With its demise having led to many battles–including one of constitutional dimension between Congress and the White House–Enron seems to be, even now, getting its wish.

If Enron had made “a new America”, it could not have been worse than the hope-and-change America of 2011. I’d much rather live in Enron-ized America. I’d love to see my stock value climbing, see technologies that should have been commonplace a decade ago, such as cloud computing and ubiquitous video, obsolete because something wonderful has replaced it.

I canna imagine anyone who wouldn’t prefer the “new America” of 1999-2001 to the utter goatfuck of today’s America.

Furthermore, I’d feel a thousand percent better if it were Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay running the show than the assclown in office today. Though I’ve never heard any whisper that Jeff Skilling had any political ambitions, he would make a better president using Enron’s model than Obama — maybe almost anyone. In Jeff Skilling’s America you wouldn’t have 40% of the population on food stamps. You certainly wouldn’t have 9% unemployment, or the weird despair that seems pervasive through society right now. Jeff Skilling’s America would be a thriving America.

Despite the hyperbole of the Forbes article, Enron really didn’t change anything in a national sense. It caused congress to get hysterical and pass SOX, but nothing fundamental has changed since its collapse. Nonetheless, it is interesting (and a bit amusing) to read articles from the thick of the scandal, to see just how wrong they all were.

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Highlights of Ken Lay’s Testimony

“You have a long list of people to blame for Enron’s collapse, sir, and it gets longer and longer as you testify,” prosecutor John Hueston said in wrapping up his cross-examination of Lay. “And your list of people to blame and events to blame did not include yourself, did it, sir?” Lay answered: “I did everything I could humanly do during this time. Did I make mistakes? I’m sure I did, Mr. Hueston. I had to make real-time decisions based on the information I had at the time.”

* * *

Lay’s parting sentiments to the jury on his final day of testimony were of love for Enron. “I loved Enron very much. I think we built a great company. I think the most painful thing in my life was watching Enron finally have to go into bankruptcy.”

* * *

Hueston presented emails and employee-survey results to show that Lay received warnings about accounting issues at Enron from several employees, not just Sherron Watkins. “I’ve lost all respect for Enron senior management,” one Enron employee said, suggesting that it was criminal for Enron executives to exercise stock options when they knew the books were being cooked. Lay told Hueston that it was easy in hindsight to second-guess his decisions while at the helm of Enron. “The corpse is on the gurney now, Mr. Hueston, and you’re carving it up any way you want to carve it up,” Lay said. “I didn’t have that luxury when I was right in the middle of battle.”

* * *

John Hueston said Lay was warned about “aggressive” accounting that went on at Enron. Lay countered that “aggressive accounting was a catchphrase” for concerns about Enron’s controversial partnerships and that Enron handled those deals properly.

* * *

Hueston questioned Lay about positive remarks he had made about Drexel Burnham Lambert, a Wall Street firm that went bankrupt in 1990 after pleading guilty to illegal securities trading. Lay said the firm was financially innovative and that “failure is not equated with criminal activity, or does not need to be equated with criminal activity.” He went further to say that the company encountered “a run on the bank back in the 1980s based on a number of events that occurred.”

* * *

Lay said to colleagues in 2001 that The Wall Street Journal had a “hate on” for Enron due to a series of articles that questioned former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow and his controversial side partnerships. “I might have used that term,” Lay said, adding that he thought the Journal was “trying to paint a very negative image of Enron.”

* * *

Hueston questioned Lay’s decision to not disclose his sale of millions of dollars worth of Enron shares back to the company between 1999 and 2001 in order to repay loans from the company. Lay replied that annual SEC filings in 1999 and 2000 disclosed that he repaid the loans. “I always tried to comply with whatever the regulations and requirements were,” Lay said. These loans, it’s worth noting, were different than bank loans to Lay that resulted in bank-fraud charges that were addressed in a separate trial that started at the conclusion of the Lay-Skilling trial.

* * *

Lay grew tired of Hueston’s accounting questions. “I think it’s a real waste of the jury’s time,” Lay scolded the prosecutor. “We’ve spent an hour on this,” he said, referring to allegations that he had tried to skirt accounting rules requiring writedowns on an overvalued British water utility, Wessex Water Ltd. Even Judge Lake, who has run a tight ship on this trial, seemed to be tired of the line of questioning. Referring to the government’s rebuttal witnesses the judge said, “”Hopefully they won’t all be on Wessex goodwill impairment.”

* * *

Prosecutor John Hueston’s cross-examination of Lay escalated quickly and the two frequently clashed. Hueston pressed Lay about an unpaid loan. “As of today, you have not repaid one dime of the principle loan of that $7.5 million?” Hueston asked. “We tried and you blocked it,” Lay snapped, adding: “Mr. Hueston, you know you blocked it,” though Lay didn’t elaborate. “It’s a simple question,” Hueston pressed. “It’s a simple answer,” Lay retorted. “Mr. Hueston, when I was sworn in here, I swore to tell the truth and the whole truth, not the partial truth.”

* * *

Lay admitted to Hueston that he tried to contact Vince Kaminski, a former top risk analyst at Enron, nine days before Kaminski testified for the prosecution. Hueston suggested that Lay was trying to sync stories with Kaminski. Lay replied: “I was trying to reach Vince Kaminski a long time ago before I even knew he would testify,” adding: “I was trying to reconnect with Vince, to talk to him about some issues I wanted to talk to him about.” In Kaminski’s testimony, he said he got a cold reaction when he told Lay and other executives in October 2001 that Enron needed “come clean” on questionable financial structures.

* * *

Lay testified that he tried to call two Goldman Sachs executives, who were on the defense’s witness list, during the trial to talk about a September 2001 meeting. Lay and Fastow gave contradicting testimony about that meeting. On the stand, Lay explained: “I was just trying to make sure that all of my facts were as accurate as they could be,” adding that Fastow “gave a fake version of that meeting.”

* * *

Lay angrily denied Hueston’s suggestion that calls to witnesses in this trial were attempts by Lay to influence their testimony. “You are distorting the phrase ‘in agreement with my story,’ ” Lay snapped. “I don’t have a story.” He added that he made the calls simply to refresh his memory and confirm his own recollection of events.

* * *

Hueston brought up the issue of Lay’s attorney calling government witness and former Enron Treasurer Ben Glisan Jr. a “performing monkey” outside the courthouse, while Lay stood by. Hueston asked if Lay later approached Glisan in sympathy. Lay said he was merely trying to comfort Glisan in a tough situation. Hueston shot back: “You made him feel better by calling him a monkey?” Lay replied: “I can’t take full responsibility for what my lawyers say or do.”

* * *

Earlier, as Secrest wrapped up his direct questioning of Lay, he asked the former Enron chairman about a $1 billion charge Enron took in October 2001 that Lay characterized as a “nonrecurring event.” Lay said outside accountants from Arthur Andersen had cleared the classification. “At least at that point they had no problem with the accounting.”

* * *

In an October 2001 conference call, Lay told analysts that Enron was “not trying to conceal anything. We’re not trying to hide anything.” Secrest asked Lay if he still believed those remarks to be fair and accurate. “I do,” Lay replied. “I did then. I do today. Based on what I knew.”

* * *

On the subject of a series of articles that appeared in The Wall Street Journal in 2001, Lay told jurors that it was “against every bone in my body” not to talk to reporters for the newspaper when it first raised questions about some Enron deals in September 2001. “My policy had always been it’s better to talk to the press than not talk to the press,” Lay said. It was PR chief Mark Palmer who told him that it would be best not to speak to the reporters, Lay told the jury, adding that his reply was: “Even though it’s against every bone in my body, I will agree with your recommendation.” He added, “We thought The Wall Street Journal was on a witch hunt against Andy Fastow and maybe Enron.”

* * *

By the time The Wall Street Journal wrote about the Fastow partnerships, they were “an “old dead issue,” Lay said. He added that the Raptors, another Fastow invention, were “history” by the time they came under scrutiny from regulators as Enron had unwound them. “These transactions have gotten so much attention in the last four years,” Lay told jurors. “But they really got so little of our attention those two years” they were in use before Enron crashed, he added.

* * *

Secrest asked Lay who gave Enron transactions quirky names like the Raptors. “Beats the hell out of me,” Lay replied.

* * *

Lay said he remained supportive of Fastow — even when he was removed from the CFO job — because “I, the board, senior management, believed he had done a good job as CFO… was doing a good job, and had no reason to believe that he wasn’t doing a great job.” Lay said that Fastow’s controversial partnerships were properly set up, approved by the board and that safeguards were put in place to ensure there weren’t any conflicts of interest. And in late 2001 when Enron took a $1 billion charge to third-quarter earnings, Lay said: “At this time, we didn’t have any information or knowledge that Andy Fastow had done anything inappropriate.”

* * *

Lay told jurors that he never spoke to Skilling about allegations of wrongdoing at Enron after Skilling resigned because it would have been “inappropriate.” Skilling had previously testified that he and Lay met soon after the allegations surfaced, but that they only discussed strategy.

* * *

Lay testified that, after two directors informed him that Fastow was paid about $45 million for his LJM work, his view of the CFO changed. “All of a sudden it appeared to me, and the board, that maybe Andy Fastow wasn’t what he appeared to be over these years,” Lay said. He also told jurors that, in October 2001, when the Enron crisis surfaced, he “realized that this was going to be a real battle.” He said he wasn’t yet worried about the viability of Enron, but he began to think that “there might be a more serious problem than I had thought.”

* * *

On day one of direct questioning, Lay lawyer George Secrest asked Lay if he’d conspired to violate federal securities rules or broke wire fraud and securities fraud laws. Mr. Lay replied firmly, “I did not.” He went even further: “I do not think there was a conspiracy. Let me be entirely clear: the last thing I would do is step back in as CEO and pick up a conspiracy.” In fact, Lay told jurors, at the time he took the reins, he believed Enron was “one of the strongest companies in the country.”

* * *

“I’m anxious to tell the truth about Enron,” Lay testified.

* * *

“I’ve not only pursued the American dream, I’ve achieved it,” Lay told Secrest. “I suppose we could say the last few years, I’ve also achieved the American nightmare.”

* * *

“I’ve been very blessed throughout my life,” he said.

* * *

When Secrest was asking him if he was part of a conspiracy at Enron, for example, Lay replied that such a thing was “the last thing he would think of doing … according to my religious faith.”

* * *

Lay told jurors that he was extremely distraught by the “hurt and destruction and pain” that resulted from Enron’s 2001 collapse, especially the employees who lost their jobs. “I’m sure there’s absolutely nothing in my life, including the loss of life of many of my loved ones, that even comes close to the same level of pain, and the same enduring pain, that has caused,” Lay said.

* * *

When Secrest asked Lay what his worst mistake was as head of Enron, Lay said the answer was easy — hiring Andrew Fastow, who admitted stealing tens of millions of dollars from the company. “It all began with the deceit of Andy Fastow,” Lay told jurors. Lay said Fastow’s theft was the beginning of the end for Enron.

* * *

Lay said Enron’s implosion was made possible by a “tinderbox” of external factors including the September 11 terrorist attacks and the market decline that came after the dot-com bubble burst. “In the end, Enron’s failure was caused by a classic run on the bank,” Lay testified. He cited published articles about former Fastow’s controversial partnerships. “They had information we didn’t even have at that time, even in late 2001,” Lay told jurors. “It was an environment very ripe to create an investor panic and more importantly a credit-market panic.” He added that Enron was then faced with “a firestorm that we couldn’t stop.”

* * *

Fastow alleged that, in 2001, he gave Lay a rundown of Enron’s problems, including huge write-offs, a massive accounting error and the deterioration of fragile financial structures that Enron used to hide losses. When asked whether Fastow ever discussed such a list of impending problems with him, Lay said: “That did not happen, period.”

* * *

Asked by his lawyer about what it’s been like watching the trial unfold, Lay said, “It’s been very interesting,”, adding: “We’ve seen a lot of interesting testimony. We’ve seen a lot of interesting people, a lot of allegations, a lot of lies, a lot of misinformation and some truth.”

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An Interesting Sequence In The 2000 Analyst Conference

Ironically, Rex Shelby was not planning on attending the 2000 analyst conference, but did so in order to host Jonathan Schwartz and Scott McNealy of Sun. Shelby met them outside, escorted them into the conference room, and sat with them in the back of the room. During the Q&A, Jonathan Schwartz, who would become CEO of Sun, was asked a question. He answered part of it and then handed the microphone to Rex for a more complete answer.

I hadn’t noticed these shots of Ken Lay in the frames before. It sort of made me sad.

Jonathan Schwartz hands off the microphone to Rex Shelby:

Ken Lay walks in front of camera:

Rex Shelby, Schwartz and Ken Lay:

Rex Shelby answering with Ken Lay in the frame:

Rex and Jonathan Schwartz laughing over some nerd joke:

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Ken Lay Wins IRS Dispute

The U.S. Tax Court ruled in favor of deceased Enron Corp. CEO Kenneth Lay, rejecting a bid by the Internal Revenue Service to collect $3.9 million from his estate and his wife.

Via Bloomberg:

The case was related to transactions among Lay, his wife, Linda, and Enron that were executed on Sept. 21, 2001. The Lays sold $10 million in annuities to Enron as part of an agreement for him to retake the CEO position, under the stipulation that the annuities would be returned to him if he worked a 4.25-year term. The company didn’t survive that long, and it filed for bankruptcy protection in December 2001.

The IRS contested the Lays’ contention that the annuities were sold to Enron, according to the Tax Court decision by Judge Joseph Goeke. In 2009, the IRS filed a notice of tax deficiency for $3.9 million, arguing that the Lays should have reported the $10 million as income in 2001. Instead, they reported that they sold the annuities to Enron at their cost basis for no gain.

Goeke said in the decision that the agency’s position was incorrect and ruled for Linda Lay and for Kenneth Lay’s estate. The transactions, he wrote, were legitimate, and neither of the Lays nor the estate received any distributions or death benefit from the annuity.

“The benefits and risks of ownership of the annuity contracts were transferred to Enron in the annuities transaction,” he wrote. “The Lays, therefore, properly reported the transaction on their federal income tax return as a sale of the two annuity contracts.”

This is a nice win for the good guys. I’m glad the IRS has been put in its place, at least in this one instance.

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Ken Lay Was A Handsome Fellow Back In The Day

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Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay’s Jury Instructions Proposal

I literally have about forty pages of these. I’m posting this one document, and as I post the others, I’ll update this one so they’ll all be found together. But I am just not in the mood to post all of them today in order. So this is one volume of proposed jury instructions.

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Government Motion To Admit Evidence That Ken Lay Failed To Repay Credit Line

The government filed this motion to ask that they be permitted to admit evidence that Ken Lay didn’t repay some loans as proof that he committed honest services fraud. Distilled to its essence, this motion is basically asking to admit irrelevant material to prejudice a jury. The government throws around the allegation that Dr. Lay failed to repay this loan – they don’t even bother mentioning an amount – while he was compensated $220 million as evidence of his “attitude toward his fiduciary responsibilities.”

I’ve searched all versions of the indictment and I can not find where they’re accusing him of having a bad attitude toward his responsibilities, and I’m pretty sure that its not illegal to have any particular “attitude” about one’s debts. So this is basically #prosecutionfail. Again.

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Twenty-Second Joint Status Report Regarding State of Discovery in USA vs. Skilling

This is the twenty-second joint status report regarding the state of discovery.It is now six years after the fact of this document and it still has the power to make my blood boil. Everything that Skilling would claim in the coming years – that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence, that they refused him access to witnesses and material, that they were just being giant douches – is here. My heart breaks for him; he was trying very hard to stop it even then, and then, as now, he was ignored.

The Enron Task Force drones on and on about how well they provided Brady material to the EBS and Nigerian Barge defendants (which in itself is dismaying) but they acknowledge they would not give Skilling access to much of the LJM and/or Andy Fastow material – which would seem to be rather important considering the charges against him. It’s a fascinating and infuriating read, well worth your time.

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