Monthly Archives: September 2011

Enron Novel, Part Two

I’m posting these chapters of my Enron novel (in progress) out of sequence to better confuse pirates and other bad actors. This is the first Broadband scene.

The girl had her own private movie running, sunk into her own thoughts, unnoticed in the mid-day crush of passengers on the train. Not that she was anonymous or insignificant. Far from it. From the moment she stepped into his range of vision, space narrowed to the space she occupied. She was petite – perhaps five feet, maybe a little taller because she wore high-heeled sandals with sexy straps wrapped around her slender ankles. She wore a summer dress in a soft cream color, shoulder-less on one side and draping over her small, fit body, which showed off stunning legs to the mid-thigh. Even with the modernized Grecian dress, one could observe a cinched waist, and no visible means of support: her braless breasts were high and full. Golden wheat-colored hair dropped to her shoulders in a wave. Her face in three-quarters profile was defined by enormous blue-green eyes of uncommon beauty and straight dark brows. It was the elegant heart-shape of her face and character in the set of her lips that finally placed her. Though she appeared slightly displaced – not exactly one of the mortals on the train – he had seen her in a more mundane setting for many years. Sunday Mayfield had been a public relations executive at Emerald Communications while he was there. Furthermore, she was on the prosecution’s witness list.

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The Demise of Enron Stock

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The Osprey Odyssee Begins

I’ve been promising a big, massive, stupendous essay – or maybe just a primer – on Osprey and Whitewing for… oh, four years now?

My friend Sheila has been promising an article about men in mirrors for just slightly longer so I don’t feel *too* bad for the delay. At least not yet.

However, I got some new diagraming software, OmniGraffle Pro, and was playing around on it and made a (very) rudimentary diagram of the Osprey/Whitewing/Condor/Enron relationship.

The subject obviously frightens me; I mean, I just think its so luminously brilliant – peerless in form, function, and luminosity – and it is difficult for me to find my way in. So I made this as a kind of way to ease myself into the subject. Just dipping a toe in because soon I will be drowning in it.

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Conversation With An Enron Executive About Mark to Market

Big is not the guy in question this time.

We went to dinner. Had a bottle of wine. I pulled out my notebook, and he went freaking berserk writing notes about Mark to Market.

I think this is just brilliant; it should be framed and sold as modern art. Such a beautiful mind.

The “M2M potential to cheat” is mine, “John Arnold, Whalley, Lou Pai” and that incomprehensible scribble is mine, and the “present value” at the bottom is mine. Everything else is his.

All this is his. Still talking about forward contracts.

All his. Notice the “VAR” – value at risk. See, it was important, something Enron took seriously.

Good times.

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It Isn’t About Me

Every week, without fail, someone will send an email or post a comment on my blog demanding to know “who I am.” Some are nice. Some say “I promise I won’t tell anyone else!” Some are rude. Some threaten me with lawsuits if I don’t reveal myself.

The whole point of not writing about myself is so that the focus is where it belongs, on Enron. If you don’t want to believe me, don’t! Please, by all means, go look it up yourself. If your opinion about Enron rests on whether or not I’m an accountant (like Jeff Skilling, I’m not), then your opinion about Enron is entirely worthless. That would tell me that you’re concerned with being called a fool if you agree with the opinion of someone who isn’t an accountant (or whatever). And that’s all about your insecurity (and snootiness), not my pedigree.

If I post an opinion piece, please, by all means disagree with me. If I post a trial transcript or an exhibit or some other unassailable fact, then whether you ignore that is a judgement call – but it can’t be ignored “because Cara isn’t an accountant.” The fact is, Jeff Skilling did not commit honest services fraud, and that is true whether or not I’m an accountant or whether I went to the right school.

Some of my posts are strong and some have less authority. I’m particularly weak in my discussions about trading, which is why you don’t see very many of them. Some may remember I worked as a trader at a hedge fund for about three minutes back in 2009 and that was plenty enough for me. Not my thing at all. I tried it, freaked out and got out. However, I am planning some trading posts soon (I’m currently in love from afar with John Lavorato, John Forney and Tim Belden). I promise, though I’m not a trader, I will do everything in my power to get the facts right. I will write earnestly. I will not try to bullshit my way through it. That is a promise I keep about ALL my posts, no matter the subject.

I have a law degree but I’m not a lawyer. You can choose to agree with my legal analyses or you can discount them because I didn’t pass the bar. That is entirely up to you.

I am a financial analyst. I don’t think it particularly matters, however, vis a vis my discussions of Enron because most of the time lately I’m talking about bonking Big, so I don’t know what difference my career choice could make in that.

My blog is a place for me to talk about what I want to talk about WHILE I’M NOT AT WORK. I don’t want to talk about me, I want to talk about Enron. Sometimes I can be absurd (my children’s fairytales, for instance) but I am always, always earnest.

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Sylvia Plath and Jeff Skilling

Perhaps I am oversensitive. I was listening again today to Sylvia Plath narrate her amazing poem, Daddy.
Listen to the first stanza:

She says:

You do not do, you do not do
Any more, black shoe
In which I have lived like a foot
For thirty years, poor and white,
Barely daring to breathe or Achoo

There was something about that cadence… the “you do not do, you do not do..” that reminded me of Jeff Skilling’s congressional testimony (it starts at 0:55).

He says:

I do not, I did not do
anything that was not
in the interest, in all the time I
worked for Enron Corporation, that was not
In the interest of the shareholders of the company.

Doesn’t that sound like the same cadence? Perhaps I’ve had too much Nyquil, but I think I’m on to something here.

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Enron Did Not Lie On Its Financial Statements

This article in the SFGate, Detecting Financial Statement Fraud, caught my eye. Sayeth one Arthur Pinkasovitch:

Looking back at Enron, perhaps the company best known for committing accounting fraud, you can see the many methods that were utilized in order to fraudulently improve the appearance of its financial statements.

I know it must be tempting to use Enron as an example for all kinds of fraud, but writers, editorialists and other opinion-mongers really need to be more careful. In fact, Enron was never accused to doing anything untoward or illegal with its financial statements. Bethany McLean, Enron-hater extraordinaire, even concedes that everything was disclosed that should be disclosed on the financial filings.

But let’s discover together this person’s incorrect gripes with Enron:

Through the use of off balance sheet special purpose vehicles the firm continued to hide its liabilities and inflate its earnings.

I do not concede that is true at all, but what does it have to do with detecting fraud in financial statements?

In 1999, limited partnerships were created for the purpose of purchasing Enron shares as a mean of improving performance of its stock.

LIAR! This is a lie. This is not a mistake; this is a flat-out lie. Enron never did anything like that. And again, what does it have to do with financial statements?

That year, the company returned 56% to its shareholders, which was followed by another 87% appreciation at the onset of the new millennium. As Enron’s aggressive accounting practices and financial statement manipulation began to spiral out of control, the scandal was eventually uncovered by the Wall Street Journal.

But you haven’t said anything at all about financial statement fraud. This is just an empire of old tires and chicken wire. It’s crap.

Shortly after, on December 2, 2001 Enron filed for Chapter 11 in what was the largest U.S. bankruptcy in history … only to be surpassed by WorldCom less than a year later.

Complex accounting fraud such as that practiced at Enron is usually extremely difficult for the average retail investor to discover.

Note that this person has not offered a single factual fraud committed by Enron. I am not being coy; that bs about its own companies buying stock to increase stock performance is just a flat out lie.

However, there are some basic red flags that help during the preliminary stages of the investigation. After all, the Enron fraud was not exposed by high paid Ivy League MBA holding Wall Street analysts, but by news reporters who used journal articles and public filings in their due diligence process.

Hilarious, the mistakes this person is making. Newp. It didn’t happen that way. Enron’s financial filings were in pristine condition. And I love the implication that somehow reporters are much smarter about fraud than analysts who, you know, analyze companies for a living.

The rest of the article is just babble; I didn’t read it all. The mistakes he made with Enron are so outrageous that I assume the rest of the article was just as wonky.

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ePower Applications

This is a screenshot of a page from the Enron ePower application disk. I like how killer is in quotes. “Killer.” Seems kinda nerdy.

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Highlights of Jeff Skilling’s Testimony

Petrocelli asked Skilling, on day two of his redirect, “Did you think of reserves as a place you could just pull out money for earnings?” Skilliing replied, “You couldn’t,” then repeated a phrase he had used several times before before — “lock box.” Skilling said that once a reserve was set aside, it went into a “lock box,” and couldn’t be tapped. “The whole characterization of reserves as a cookie jar is demonstratively untrue,” Skilling said.

* * *

As Petrocelli began his redirect questioning of Skilling, he said to his client: “Do you think you’re so smart that you can fool this jury?” Skilling replied: “Of course not.”

* * *

In the final day of cross-examination, Skilling denied that a decision to move part of one Enron division into another, more profitable unit was aimed at hiding losses in the first unit. “You have assigned a motive to me, which is I was worried we would show big losses in EES,” Skilling told prosecutor Sean Berkowitz. “It was my state of mind at the time that EES was more likely to show a profit than a loss. That is my testimony,” Skilling said.

* * *

“I didn’t think ‘trading company’ reflected, in my view, what Enron was,” Skilling said.
“And you were communicating that to the marketplace, correct?” Berkowitz asked.
“That’s correct,” Skilling replied.
Ken Rice testified earlier in the trial that Skilling told him Enron’s stock would get “whacked” if the market perceived it as a trading company.

* * *
“I think we tried very hard, very hard to communicate very specifically the risk positions in our business.”

* * *

Berkowitz presented documents from Enron’s risk-assessment group that informed top executives of poor-performing assets. Skilling replied that the items listed weren’t a significant percentage of Enron’s total assets. “Out of hundreds of investments Enron made, these are the ones being watched,” Skilling said, comparing the evidence to checking baseball rankings and only highlighting the worst two teams. Berkowitz replied: “Let’s talk not about baseball, Mr. Skilling, let’s talk about Enron,” prompting Skilling to fire back: “This is a misrepresentation.”

* * *

Berkowitz played a tape of former SEC commissioner Arthur Levitt on the problem of “earnings management” in corporate America. He then turned to Skilling and said, “Is it inappropriate for a corporation to make last-minute changes to solely meet an earnings target?” Skilling responded yes. Then, Berkowitz trotted out prior witnesses’ testimony that suggested Skilling had ordered a last-minute change to fourth-quarter 1999 earnings, raising the reported number by a penny a share, to meet Wall Street’s target. Skilling said he has no recollection of that. “I want to say more strongly than ‘I don’t remember,’” Skilling said. “I’m thinking there’s a good chance it did not occur.”

* * *

Berkowitz asked Skilling about a script for an April 2001 conference call on first-quarter earnings. It was written by investor relations, but Berkowitz said Skilling left out the part about the company’s expectation that Broadband would likely lose up to $100 million in 2001, rather than Skilling’s prior forecast of $65 million. Berkowitz asked if Skilling could choose to omit something from the script. “Yes,” Skilling replied, hesitantly. “Sometimes I would add and subtract words form the script.”

* * *

Skilling testified that Enron did not dip into reserves to pad earnings. Berkowitz displayed for jurors a chart that showed more than $1 billion in reserves were “available for earnings,” and Skilling said he misinterpreted the document. “You misunderstand how reserves are calculated, approved and set,” Skilling said.

* * *

After the above “earnings-management” exchange, Berkowitz suggested they move on to another line of questioning. Skilling, not one for handing over the reins, snapped: “No, let’s not move on. Let’s talk about the financial reports.” Skilling continued, but Berkowitz cut him off: “I know it is difficult for you to sit here and answer questions, Mr. Skilling, and I know you at times overreact to people who are critical,” the prosecutor said. “But if you could just let me ask the questions, and we’ll move along, Mr. Skilling.”

* * *

On the first day of cross-examination, Skilling told prosecutor Sean Berkowitz, “I have nothing to hide.”

* * *

Prosecutors zoomed in on Skilling’s attempt at selling 200,000 shares of Enron stock less than a month after he resigned and his claim that he’d forgotten about the order. “You just forgot about that original order, correct?” Berkowitz asked. “That’s correct, yes,” Skilling replied. “You owed those shareholders a duty of honesty, didn’t you?” Berkowitz asked. “Yes,” Skilling replied.

* * *

When asked if the gap between the values booked for Enron assets what those assets would earn if sold was a problem, Skilling replied: “There is no company in the United States of America where if they wanted to sell their assets today, they would receive book value.”

* * *

Skilling cracked a smile when comparing operating a business in the state of California in 2000 to the risks of operating in developing countries. “Do you think that was funny?” Berkowitz asked angrily. “I felt the state of California was unfairly targeting Enron,” Skilling replied. Berkowitz asked if Skilling regretted making light of California’s plight — he once compared the state to the Titanic. Skilling replied, “You know what was going on in California,” but concede that he did regret the joke.

* * *

“At the end of the day, it’s your word … that is at issue, correct?” Berkowitz asked. “I think it’s really a question of figuring out what makes sense,” Skilling replied, adding, “and I hope the jury looks at this and tries to figure out what makes sense.”

* * *

The defense zoomed in on testimony from Kevin Hannon, who quoted Skilling as saying “They’re on to us,” at a 2001 meeting. Skilling told jurors that he may have said that phrase, but he was joking and mimicking the “Saturday Night Live” character, Mr. Bill. Skilling imitated the high-pitched voice of the character, and said that his friend, Cliff Baxter, may have said, “Oh, no, Mr. Bill!” which may have prompted Skilling to reply: “Oh, no, they’re on to us!” The re-enactment drew some laughter from the courtroom.

* * *

As Petrocelli led his client through the government’s indictment, Skilling testified that prosecutors have misrepresented him. “I think they have purposely not looked at facts they should have looked at if they wanted to come to a more balanced and accurate conclusion,” Skilling said. “There has been a lot of damage done by individuals subsequent to that [the company's collapse] that is a result not of facts, not as a result of what really happened, but as a result of rewriting of history to accomplish certain objectives that people have that were not consistent with what happened in the company.”

* * *

“This is a total misrepresentation, in my view, of the state of events that was occurring at the time, and I believe it would be very easy for someone to confirm that if they had any interest in confirming that,” Skilling said.

* * *

“Did you believe you firmly had your hand on the wheel?” Petrocelli asked. “Yes, I did,” Skilling replied. “Did you think you were defending your company?” Petrocelli pressed. “Yes I did,” Skilling answered. “Did you think you had to lie to defend your company?” Petrocelli asked. “No, I did not,” Skilling said.

* * *

“Did you believe in the company?” Petrocelli asked. “I bled Enron blue,” Skilling replied. “I believed in this company. I believed this was a fine company … a vibrant company in fact having some of the best financial performance in the history of the company.”

* * *

Skilling testified about shortsellers, who benefit when a stock price drops, who moved in on Enron shares in March 2001. He told the jury that he generally believes shortsellers are a service to the market, but this was a group attack. “What I was concerned about and believed was not good, there was group of people that were working together, in my opinion, working as a group to attack the stock,” Skilling said.

* * *

Enron’s former investor-relations chief, Mark Koenig testified that Skilling turned to him during an analyst conference call to answer a question. Koenig said he lied to keep analysts from further questioning why the broadband unit wasn’t making more money from its primary objective. So, why didn’t Skilling speak up? “I’m not sure it occurred to me it was incorrect,” Skilling said. “Did you knowingly tell Mr. Koenig to answer a question falsely while you were on these analyst calls?” Petrocelli asked. “No,” Skilling replied.

* * *

Former Enron executive David Delainey testified earlier in the trial that Skilling had given him a “hug and a kiss” after Delainey told Skilling that he, Delainey, had stashed $800 million in a reserve account. “Did you kiss him?” Petrocelli asked Skilling. “I might have kissed him,” Skilling replied. “Not kiss kiss, you know, I was just happy.” Petrocelli then sought further clarification: “You kissed Mr. Delainey because you thought he did something good, not because he did something illegal,” Petrocelli asked, to which Skilling replied: “Yes.”

* * *

The point of the Raptors, Skilling said, was “to create an incubator, put Enron stock in it, and use Enron stock with the hope that it goes up.” He added that the Raptors were reviewed “by a large number of people,” and that he never would have endorsed such a financial structure if he’d known that it was fraudulent.

* * *

Skilling testified that at first, he thought the LJM partnerships were a good idea because “the benefits outweighed the risks of the structure.” Knowing what he now knows, Skilling said, “It was a horrible idea.”

* * *

Skilling told jurors that, until he read about it in the newspapers in 2003 or 2004, he had never hear of the infamous “global galactic” list that Fastow said was approved by Skilling as an assurance that the LJMs wouldn’t lose money on deals with Enron.

* * *

Petrocelli asked Skilling about government allegations that he set aside $1 billion in reserves to balance the firm’s volatile trading business, which sometimes made big gains, but also made big losses. Setting aside money, however, decreases earnings, Petrocelli pointed out in his line of questioning. Then, hammering home his argument: “Does it make sense,” then, that you would drain earnings to create reserves, while at the same time “manufacturing” earnings, as the government has alleged? “No,” Skilling replied.

* * *

Skilling told jurors that he and Lay were a “good team,” and that each had different strengths. Skilling focused on the domestic business — especially the wholesale energy-trading unit. Lay was more involved in Enron’s international ventures and with government officials. “I was not particularly good at dealing with government officials,” Skilling said.

* * *

Skilling testified that neither he nor Lay ever knowingly broke the law. “Did you and Ken Lay ever discuss doing something you knew to be forbidden by law?” Petrocelli asked him. “No,” Skilling replied, adding, “I was aware of no illegal activity occurring at Enron Corporation.”

* * *

Petrocelli asked, “Did you tell [Enron employees] you didn’t want to know about it, just take care of it, hit the numbers, or whatever?” Skilling replied: “No.”

* * *

Skilling testified that there were no “dire consequences” for missing earnings estimates. “If you had any reasonable explanation, the market would be just fine with that.”

* * *

Skilling told jurors that he relied on subordinates to approve earnings numbers and earnings announcements. “I’m relying on the system we put in place, the control and reporting system to ensure that those [earnings] are done properly,” Skilling said.

* * *

After establishing that Skilling was a smart guy, Petrocelli asked, “Are you smart enough to mastermind this kind of conspiracy and pull it off without getting caught for years?” To which Skilling replied, “I don’t think so.”

* * *

Responding to Fastow’s testimony that Skilling once said of side deals Fastow was concocting, “Get me as much of that juice as you can.” Skilling testified that he didn’t recalling having made that comment. “I don’t use the word ‘juice’ in that context,” Skilling told jurors.

* * *

“Was LJM a puppet of Enron?” Petrocelli asked Skilling. “No, it wasn’t,” Skilling replied. He went further to say the LJM deals accounted for a small portion of Enron business. “This was a molehill,” he said, “something you would hardly notice, frankly.”

* * *

Skilling also denied that he gave Fastow “bear hugs,” which the former CFO had testified were promises that LJM wouldn’t lose money on deals with Enron. Skilling said he became “exasperated” with Fastow’s growing ties to the side partnerships and ultimately told him he had to choose between LJM and Enron. Fastow chose Enron, but kept secret ties to LJM, Skilling said.

* * *

“I will fight those charges until the day I die,” Skilling said. “I am absolutely innocent.”

* * *

Skilling admitted early in his testimony that he was nervous. When Petrocelli asked him why, he replied: “I guess in some ways my life is on the line, so I’m a little nervous.”

* * *

The defense moved swiftly to highlight Skilling’s softer side. Skilling described for jurors the pride he felt in Enron’s growth and how excited he felt each day walking into the company’s gleaming Houston headquarters. “We were making the world better,” he testified.

* * *

Petrocelli asked Skilling if he had any clue what was coming down the pike at Enron when he resigned. “Not in my wildest dreams, no,” Skilling replied. “It’s almost inconceivable now what happened,” he added.

* * *

Skilling maintains that, at the time he resigned from Enron, he had no idea the company was about to fall apart. So, who did he leave? “I was emotionally tired,” Skilling testified. “I put so much of my life into [Enron]. Every day was intense. I had not spent the time I should have spent with my family.”

* * *

Skilling told jurors that it was “very painful” for him to watch the repercussions of Enron’s collapse as thousands of employees lost their jobs. “It was unbelievable. Unbelievable,” Skilling said. He maintains that he is innocent, but said he did feel a sense of “responsibility” as one of the company’s former leaders. “You wanted to die.”

* * *

Skilling said he believed short sellers, who profit when a stock falls, fed false stories to The Wall Street Journal in 2001, which he says contributed to Enron’s collapse. “The Wall Street Journal was totally out of line,” Skilling testified. “I had never seen an article that was that one-sided.”

* * *

Skilling testified that he had been calling Lay about the increasingly troubling string of Wall Street Journal articles about Enron in the fall of 2001. He told jurors that he urged Lay to “open the kimono” and make public information about LJM deals.

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Highlights of Ken Lay’s Testimony

“You have a long list of people to blame for Enron’s collapse, sir, and it gets longer and longer as you testify,” prosecutor John Hueston said in wrapping up his cross-examination of Lay. “And your list of people to blame and events to blame did not include yourself, did it, sir?” Lay answered: “I did everything I could humanly do during this time. Did I make mistakes? I’m sure I did, Mr. Hueston. I had to make real-time decisions based on the information I had at the time.”

* * *

Lay’s parting sentiments to the jury on his final day of testimony were of love for Enron. “I loved Enron very much. I think we built a great company. I think the most painful thing in my life was watching Enron finally have to go into bankruptcy.”

* * *

Hueston presented emails and employee-survey results to show that Lay received warnings about accounting issues at Enron from several employees, not just Sherron Watkins. “I’ve lost all respect for Enron senior management,” one Enron employee said, suggesting that it was criminal for Enron executives to exercise stock options when they knew the books were being cooked. Lay told Hueston that it was easy in hindsight to second-guess his decisions while at the helm of Enron. “The corpse is on the gurney now, Mr. Hueston, and you’re carving it up any way you want to carve it up,” Lay said. “I didn’t have that luxury when I was right in the middle of battle.”

* * *

John Hueston said Lay was warned about “aggressive” accounting that went on at Enron. Lay countered that “aggressive accounting was a catchphrase” for concerns about Enron’s controversial partnerships and that Enron handled those deals properly.

* * *

Hueston questioned Lay about positive remarks he had made about Drexel Burnham Lambert, a Wall Street firm that went bankrupt in 1990 after pleading guilty to illegal securities trading. Lay said the firm was financially innovative and that “failure is not equated with criminal activity, or does not need to be equated with criminal activity.” He went further to say that the company encountered “a run on the bank back in the 1980s based on a number of events that occurred.”

* * *

Lay said to colleagues in 2001 that The Wall Street Journal had a “hate on” for Enron due to a series of articles that questioned former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow and his controversial side partnerships. “I might have used that term,” Lay said, adding that he thought the Journal was “trying to paint a very negative image of Enron.”

* * *

Hueston questioned Lay’s decision to not disclose his sale of millions of dollars worth of Enron shares back to the company between 1999 and 2001 in order to repay loans from the company. Lay replied that annual SEC filings in 1999 and 2000 disclosed that he repaid the loans. “I always tried to comply with whatever the regulations and requirements were,” Lay said. These loans, it’s worth noting, were different than bank loans to Lay that resulted in bank-fraud charges that were addressed in a separate trial that started at the conclusion of the Lay-Skilling trial.

* * *

Lay grew tired of Hueston’s accounting questions. “I think it’s a real waste of the jury’s time,” Lay scolded the prosecutor. “We’ve spent an hour on this,” he said, referring to allegations that he had tried to skirt accounting rules requiring writedowns on an overvalued British water utility, Wessex Water Ltd. Even Judge Lake, who has run a tight ship on this trial, seemed to be tired of the line of questioning. Referring to the government’s rebuttal witnesses the judge said, “”Hopefully they won’t all be on Wessex goodwill impairment.”

* * *

Prosecutor John Hueston’s cross-examination of Lay escalated quickly and the two frequently clashed. Hueston pressed Lay about an unpaid loan. “As of today, you have not repaid one dime of the principle loan of that $7.5 million?” Hueston asked. “We tried and you blocked it,” Lay snapped, adding: “Mr. Hueston, you know you blocked it,” though Lay didn’t elaborate. “It’s a simple question,” Hueston pressed. “It’s a simple answer,” Lay retorted. “Mr. Hueston, when I was sworn in here, I swore to tell the truth and the whole truth, not the partial truth.”

* * *

Lay admitted to Hueston that he tried to contact Vince Kaminski, a former top risk analyst at Enron, nine days before Kaminski testified for the prosecution. Hueston suggested that Lay was trying to sync stories with Kaminski. Lay replied: “I was trying to reach Vince Kaminski a long time ago before I even knew he would testify,” adding: “I was trying to reconnect with Vince, to talk to him about some issues I wanted to talk to him about.” In Kaminski’s testimony, he said he got a cold reaction when he told Lay and other executives in October 2001 that Enron needed “come clean” on questionable financial structures.

* * *

Lay testified that he tried to call two Goldman Sachs executives, who were on the defense’s witness list, during the trial to talk about a September 2001 meeting. Lay and Fastow gave contradicting testimony about that meeting. On the stand, Lay explained: “I was just trying to make sure that all of my facts were as accurate as they could be,” adding that Fastow “gave a fake version of that meeting.”

* * *

Lay angrily denied Hueston’s suggestion that calls to witnesses in this trial were attempts by Lay to influence their testimony. “You are distorting the phrase ‘in agreement with my story,’ ” Lay snapped. “I don’t have a story.” He added that he made the calls simply to refresh his memory and confirm his own recollection of events.

* * *

Hueston brought up the issue of Lay’s attorney calling government witness and former Enron Treasurer Ben Glisan Jr. a “performing monkey” outside the courthouse, while Lay stood by. Hueston asked if Lay later approached Glisan in sympathy. Lay said he was merely trying to comfort Glisan in a tough situation. Hueston shot back: “You made him feel better by calling him a monkey?” Lay replied: “I can’t take full responsibility for what my lawyers say or do.”

* * *

Earlier, as Secrest wrapped up his direct questioning of Lay, he asked the former Enron chairman about a $1 billion charge Enron took in October 2001 that Lay characterized as a “nonrecurring event.” Lay said outside accountants from Arthur Andersen had cleared the classification. “At least at that point they had no problem with the accounting.”

* * *

In an October 2001 conference call, Lay told analysts that Enron was “not trying to conceal anything. We’re not trying to hide anything.” Secrest asked Lay if he still believed those remarks to be fair and accurate. “I do,” Lay replied. “I did then. I do today. Based on what I knew.”

* * *

On the subject of a series of articles that appeared in The Wall Street Journal in 2001, Lay told jurors that it was “against every bone in my body” not to talk to reporters for the newspaper when it first raised questions about some Enron deals in September 2001. “My policy had always been it’s better to talk to the press than not talk to the press,” Lay said. It was PR chief Mark Palmer who told him that it would be best not to speak to the reporters, Lay told the jury, adding that his reply was: “Even though it’s against every bone in my body, I will agree with your recommendation.” He added, “We thought The Wall Street Journal was on a witch hunt against Andy Fastow and maybe Enron.”

* * *

By the time The Wall Street Journal wrote about the Fastow partnerships, they were “an “old dead issue,” Lay said. He added that the Raptors, another Fastow invention, were “history” by the time they came under scrutiny from regulators as Enron had unwound them. “These transactions have gotten so much attention in the last four years,” Lay told jurors. “But they really got so little of our attention those two years” they were in use before Enron crashed, he added.

* * *

Secrest asked Lay who gave Enron transactions quirky names like the Raptors. “Beats the hell out of me,” Lay replied.

* * *

Lay said he remained supportive of Fastow — even when he was removed from the CFO job — because “I, the board, senior management, believed he had done a good job as CFO… was doing a good job, and had no reason to believe that he wasn’t doing a great job.” Lay said that Fastow’s controversial partnerships were properly set up, approved by the board and that safeguards were put in place to ensure there weren’t any conflicts of interest. And in late 2001 when Enron took a $1 billion charge to third-quarter earnings, Lay said: “At this time, we didn’t have any information or knowledge that Andy Fastow had done anything inappropriate.”

* * *

Lay told jurors that he never spoke to Skilling about allegations of wrongdoing at Enron after Skilling resigned because it would have been “inappropriate.” Skilling had previously testified that he and Lay met soon after the allegations surfaced, but that they only discussed strategy.

* * *

Lay testified that, after two directors informed him that Fastow was paid about $45 million for his LJM work, his view of the CFO changed. “All of a sudden it appeared to me, and the board, that maybe Andy Fastow wasn’t what he appeared to be over these years,” Lay said. He also told jurors that, in October 2001, when the Enron crisis surfaced, he “realized that this was going to be a real battle.” He said he wasn’t yet worried about the viability of Enron, but he began to think that “there might be a more serious problem than I had thought.”

* * *

On day one of direct questioning, Lay lawyer George Secrest asked Lay if he’d conspired to violate federal securities rules or broke wire fraud and securities fraud laws. Mr. Lay replied firmly, “I did not.” He went even further: “I do not think there was a conspiracy. Let me be entirely clear: the last thing I would do is step back in as CEO and pick up a conspiracy.” In fact, Lay told jurors, at the time he took the reins, he believed Enron was “one of the strongest companies in the country.”

* * *

“I’m anxious to tell the truth about Enron,” Lay testified.

* * *

“I’ve not only pursued the American dream, I’ve achieved it,” Lay told Secrest. “I suppose we could say the last few years, I’ve also achieved the American nightmare.”

* * *

“I’ve been very blessed throughout my life,” he said.

* * *

When Secrest was asking him if he was part of a conspiracy at Enron, for example, Lay replied that such a thing was “the last thing he would think of doing … according to my religious faith.”

* * *

Lay told jurors that he was extremely distraught by the “hurt and destruction and pain” that resulted from Enron’s 2001 collapse, especially the employees who lost their jobs. “I’m sure there’s absolutely nothing in my life, including the loss of life of many of my loved ones, that even comes close to the same level of pain, and the same enduring pain, that has caused,” Lay said.

* * *

When Secrest asked Lay what his worst mistake was as head of Enron, Lay said the answer was easy — hiring Andrew Fastow, who admitted stealing tens of millions of dollars from the company. “It all began with the deceit of Andy Fastow,” Lay told jurors. Lay said Fastow’s theft was the beginning of the end for Enron.

* * *

Lay said Enron’s implosion was made possible by a “tinderbox” of external factors including the September 11 terrorist attacks and the market decline that came after the dot-com bubble burst. “In the end, Enron’s failure was caused by a classic run on the bank,” Lay testified. He cited published articles about former Fastow’s controversial partnerships. “They had information we didn’t even have at that time, even in late 2001,” Lay told jurors. “It was an environment very ripe to create an investor panic and more importantly a credit-market panic.” He added that Enron was then faced with “a firestorm that we couldn’t stop.”

* * *

Fastow alleged that, in 2001, he gave Lay a rundown of Enron’s problems, including huge write-offs, a massive accounting error and the deterioration of fragile financial structures that Enron used to hide losses. When asked whether Fastow ever discussed such a list of impending problems with him, Lay said: “That did not happen, period.”

* * *

Asked by his lawyer about what it’s been like watching the trial unfold, Lay said, “It’s been very interesting,”, adding: “We’ve seen a lot of interesting testimony. We’ve seen a lot of interesting people, a lot of allegations, a lot of lies, a lot of misinformation and some truth.”

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Highlights of Ben Glisan’s Testimony

“We needed that cash and needed it badly. There wasn’t a plan to hold onto these assets for a better deal,” Glisan testified, in response to a defense suggestion that Enron held poor-performing assets in hopes of securing a better price.

* * *

Glisan was asked whether short-sellers, who make money when a stock falls, could disrupt Enron’s access to capital markets. “It’s true that short-sellers want to interject negative information. The question is can the company respond to it?”

* * *

On cross-examination, Lay lawyer Bruce Collins sought to poke holes in Glisan’s assertion that he adequately warned Lay in October 2001 of Enron’s shaky finances. Collins cited a corporate secretary’s notes from an October 2001 board meeting that showed Glisan told directors — including Lay — that Enron had immediate access to $1.5 billion in cash and more was “under consideration by the company.”

* * *

Glisan acknowledged that he walked out of a meeting on Oct. 22, 2001 before Enron’s accounting chief told Lay and the other directors that auditors had determined that no write-down would be necessary for the company’s water unit. Collins presented Glisan’s admission to the jury as evidence that Glisan, Lay and Skilling were working off of different information.

* * *

Glisan testified about the financial structures that he helped design that had no other business purpose than to help Enron manage its accounting of losses and poor assets. “We took pride — I took pride — in helping the company do that,” Glisan told the jury.

* * *

Glisan testified that, at an October 23, 2001 meeting, he told Fastow that “bankers had lost confidence in him and the expectation was he would leave the company.”

* * *
Collins took issue with Glisan’s characterization of Lay “giggling … in delight” at the notion that outside auditors had approved of the Raptors. “I’ve gotten to know Mr. Lay pretty well. He may chuckle, but he doesn’t giggle,” Collins said. “I concede chuckle as opposed to giggle,” Glisan replied.

* * *

One of the defense’s key arguments is that Enron’s collapsed was triggered by a loss of investor confidence not fraud. “If Enron hadn’t gone bankrupt, we wouldn’t be here, would we?” Petrocelli asked, to which Glisan replied: “That’s hard to know.”

* * *

Glisan testified that, in October 2001, he told Lay that “Bankruptcy is inevitable,” and that Lay didn’t have much of a reaction, though seemed “somewhat resigned.” The next day, according to a transcript of a meeting shown to jurors, Lay told employees, “The company is doing well financially and operationally,” and “liquidity is fine.”

* * *

Petrocelli’s cross of Glisan got heated at times, with Petrocelli at one point asking Glisan if he’d “lied all day” on the stand Wednesday when he gave detailed accounts of wrongdoing by Enron management. “Absolutely not,” Glisan replied.

* * *

Petrocelli accused Glisan of signing a statement that was written for him by prosecutors. “They picked the crime, they wrote it up, you signed your name!” Petrocelli said. “I wrote it,” Glisan replied. “I edited it to make sure the statement I gave was accurate.”

* * *

Glisan testified that Skilling backed the Raptors as a way to skirt accounting rules, though admitted that he had no notes, emails or documentation to that effect. “The conversations were quite memorable,” Glisan said, defending his recollection. And even though he took extensive notes during his last two years at Enron, he testified that, “some of the meetings I had with Mr. Lay did not allow me the opportunity to take notes.”

* * *

Glisan described to jurors his first pitch of the Raptors to Enron’s finance committee in May 2000. Enron’s former top accountant, Richard Causey, told the committee that the structure was risky but nonetheless approved by outside auditors. Lay’s response was to “giggle in delight,” according to Glisan’s testimony.

* * *

In 2001, Lay asked Glisan to find out how large a write-down would have to be to affect the energy giant’s credit rating, according to Glisan’s testimony. “That’s backwards,” Glisan told jurors. “What should occur is we should take the charges that we needed to take and then deal with the consequences.” What actually occurred, Glisan said, was that Enron reported a charge of about $1 billion, which wouldn’t prompt a downgrade, instead of the several billion in actual charges that executives had discussed internally.

* * *

At one meeting, several Enron executives suggested doing away with “structured finance” transactions to help the company manufacture earnings. According to Glisan, Lay replied: “we rely on these; they are imperative to hit our numbers and we’re going to keep doing them.”

* * *

Lay went to the board’s finance committee to ask for an increase in the risk Enron’s trading unit could take on, Glisan testified. When the committee chairman balked, Glisan said Lay countered with: “were the finance committee not able to increase risk limit, we might not reach our earnings targets … and might have to issue a warning” on earnings.

* * *
On the day Skilling resigned, Enron’s financial condition was “weak,” Glisan testified. That same day, Lay and Skilling offered an upbeat assessment of the company and outlook. When asked if Lay and Skilling were aware of Enron’s problems, Glisan replied, “Yes, they were.”

* * *

Glisan testified that there were “billions of dollars of embedded losses” in Enron’s international assets. The company didn’t take write-downs because it would have required “a larger loss than we could have stomached,” Glisan said.

* * *

Outside the jury’s presence, Glisan invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked if he committed any other crimes while at Enron.

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Highlights of Andy Fastow’s Testimony

One of the last issues raised in Fastow’s testimony was a series of calls from Skilling in October 2001, after Skilling had resigned, asking Fastow “why Enron wasn’t telling its story,” when The Wall Street Journal was writing about LJM. Skilling said that “all the transactions were proper and fully disclosed,” and that “shareholders should give us medals for doing all these deals,” Fastow testified. On redirect by prosecutor John Hueston, Fastow said he didn’t believe Skilling was urging him to go public about their alleged secret deals, but rather “The way I heard it was, ‘Toe the party line’ ” about LJM, he said.

* * *

Ken Lay’s lawyer Mike Ramsey asked Fastow on cross-examination,”In connection with stealing from Enron, you were just looking Mr. Lay in the face and telling him a lie?” Fastow replied: “Yes, I was not loyal to him or Enron when I committed those crimes.”

* * *

Skilling’s attorney Daniel Petrocelli questioned Fastow about the authenticity of the “global galactic” memo. “Is there some possibility, sir, that later on, having perhaps lost or tossed out the original, you went back and recreated or reconstructed the list?,” Petrocelli asked. “No, sir,” Fastow replied.

* * *

Petrocelli also asked Fastow whether he was “100% certain” that the initials on the global galactic list were indeed those of former top Enron accountant Richard Causey. “I recall being there when Mr. Causey initialed them, seeing him do that,” Fastow said.

* * *

Fastow testified about a list known as “global galactic,” that documented profits promised to partnerships run by Fastow when they did deals with Enron. “We had side agreements. That’s how we did business. This was a list of side agreements after the agreements had been entered into,” Fastow said. “Because the list was getting long, this was my way of keeping track of it, and [assuring] Mr. Causey, he was keeping track of it the same way.”

* * *

Fastow testified that Causey not only approved global galactic but assured him Skilling was on board. But Petrocelli pointed out that Skilling didn’t initial the document. “If you really wanted to be sure Mr. Skilling was on board, you could have taken the 60 seconds to walk from your office to his office, show him these pieces of paper and have him initial them,” Petrocelli said. “I suppose so,” Fastow replied, adding, “It never dawned on me that it would be necessary to do so.”

* * *

Petrocelli asked Fastow about the infamous Nigerian barge deal involving LJM2 and four former Merrill Lynch employees who served prison sentences over their involvement in the deal. “I believe I would not have acquired the barges without that bear hug” from Skilling, Fastow said. “I did that largely based on my understanding that LJM2 would have a similar guarantee from Mr. Skilling that it would be taken out in the future if necessary without a loss and its rate of return.”

* * *

Fastow testified that former chairman Ken Lay was at a meeting in August 2001 in which he heard about a “hole in earnings” at Enron, just days before he gave a BusinessWeek interview claiming Enron was in its “best shape” ever. Fastow said of the Lay interview, “I think most of the statements in there are false.”

* * *

In a heated cross-examination by Skilling lawyer Daniel Petrocelli, Fastow admitted, “I believe I was extremely greedy, and that I lost my moral compass, and I’ve done terrible things that I very much regret.”

* * *

Petrocelli, at one point, told Fastow that his answers sounded well-rehearsed, to which Fastow replied: “With all due respect, your questions sound very rehearsed to me.” Petrocelli shot back, “We’re talking about the fact that your wife, because of your conduct, spent one year doing hard time. And you think that’s funny?” Fastow answered, “No, sir, it is not funny at all.”

* * *

Lay opted to characterize a loss on an investment in the third quarter of 2001 as “nonrecurring,” even though a gain on the same holding was earlier characterized as “recurring,” Fastow testified, adding, “I thought that was an incorrect accounting treatment.”

* * *

By October 2001, Enron’s suppliers refused to trade with the company and Fastow testified that he feared the company would collapse and that he and an aide went to Lay to warn him. “I said I thought this was a death spiral, a serious risk of bankruptcy. I said the majority of trades being done were to unwind positions.”

* * *

“Within the culture of corruption Enron had, a culture that rewarded financial reporting rather than rewarding economic value, I believed I was being a hero. I was not. It was not a good thing. That’s why I’m here today.”

* * *

LJM1, was designed to help the company “solve a problem,” Fastow testified. “We were doing this to inflate our earnings, and I don’t think we wanted to show people what we were doing.”

* * *

Fastow quoted Skilling as saying, “Get me as much of that juice as you can,” after Fastow informed him that more money would need to be raised to continue making deals like LJM1.

* * *

Fastow testified that partnerships like the LJMs were willing to do deals that Enron “just couldn’t do with others” because they were too risky or didn’t make economic sense.

* * *

Fastow testified about pressure from Skilling to have one of the LJMs buy a minority stake in a Brazilian power plant owned by Enron because Enron’s South American unit was struggling to meet its earnings target. “I told him it was a piece of s–t, and no one would buy it,” Fastow said, adding that he relented, in part, because Skilling assured him he wouldn’t lose money on the deal. Fastow testified that there were many more “bear-hug” guarantees like this from Skilling in mid-2000.

* * *

Fastow testified that the LJMs were legal and did many legal deals, but “certain things I did as general partner of LJM were illegal.”

* * *

Skilling was concerned, Fastow testified, that off-balance-sheet deals like the LJMs would “attract attention, and if dissected, people would see what the purpose of the partnership was, which was to mask potentially hundreds of millions of dollars of losses.”

* * *

Fastow tearfully admitted that he “misled” his wife about some of the money the couple earned from Enron-related deals. “She would not, in my opinion, have signed a fraudulent tax return,” Fastow said. Lea Fastow served one year in federal prison for filing a false tax return.

* * *

Fastow said he instructed Michael Kopper to send $10,000 checks to each of his sons. The checks were portrayed as gifts to the boys, but really they were proceeds from a business deal. “I shouldn’t have. It was the wrong thing to do.”

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Defense Witnesses in the Skilling/Lay Trial

No. 1: Joannie Williamson, former assistant to Lay, Skilling
Williamson worked in the chairman’s office and was a former assistant to both Lay and Skilling. She had also previously worked for former Enron investor-relations chief Mark Koenig, who she said was also a family friend.

Testimony: Williamson testified that Koenig told her that he pleaded guilty to Enron-related crimes just to get the ordeal behind him, not because he was guilty.

Ms. Williamson said Mr. Koenig called her the day he pleaded guilty. “I said, ‘You’re not guilty,’ ” Ms. Williamson told the jury, “and he said, ‘I know that, but in order for this to work, everyone needs to believe that I am.’ ” She also told jurors that she thought Koenig had lied on the stand.

No. 2: Scott Stoness, former EES analyst
Stoness was an analyst for Enron Energy Services, the company’s retail unit that provided energy services to mostly industrial companies.

Testimony: Stoness challenged prior testimony from David Delainey, the former head of EES. Delainey has told jurors that he reluctantly agreed to a Skilling-approved plan to merge part of the failing EES unit into a larger, profitable division to hide $200 million in losses. Stoness testified that Enron didn’t know until two months after the merger that the unit would post such losses.

No. 3: Diann Huddleson, former EES analyst
Huddleson was an analyst for Enron Energy Services, the company’s retail unit that provided energy services to mostly industrial companies.

Testimony: Huddleson was also called to counter prior testimony from unit chief Delainey. She told jurors that the unit wasn’t in the state of disarray that Delainey and other witnesses claimed. She said she personally chased customers to pay their bills, notable during the California energy crisis.

She was also called to debunk prior witnesses’ claims that Enron raided its reserves to pad earnings. She said those reserves had another purpose – to cover losses from California utilities that failed to pay their bills.

No. 4: Roger Herndon, former Enron risk manager
Herndon, a former risk manager, was assigned to evaluate problem contracts at Enron’s wholesale units.

Testimony: Herndon was called to bolster the defense’s claim that the retail unit was folded into the larger, more profitable wholesale-energy unit for legitimate purposes — to reduce duplication and perhaps save money — not to hide losses as prior witnesses have claimed.

Under cross-examination by prosecutors, Herndon admitted that he told another employee that the retail unit’s risk-management efforts were “a mess,” and that he wasn’t pleased with what he found.

No. 5: Sarah Davis, former Enron human-resources supervisor
Davis was a former human-resources supervisor at Enron.

Testimony: Davis told jurors that she processed more than 100 new hires each month at Enron and that the company wasn’t hiding layoffs at its Internet unit, countering prior testimony from former broadband chief Ken Rice that Skilling ordered him to make layoffs of more than 200 people appear to be a “redeployment” to save face with investors. These were, in fact, redeployments, she testified, and not layoffs. Employees were given opportunities to shift to other assignments, she said.

On cross-examination by prosecutors, Davis conceded that it wasn’t part of her job responsibilities to keep up with the reasons why employees were redeployed or laid off.

No. 6: Wade Cline, former head of Dabhol power plant
With fourteen years at the company, Cline headed the company’s Dabhol power plant in western India and became the Enron India’s general counsel.

Testimony: Cline’s testimony was aimed at countering prior testimony from Fastow and Glisan, who both said that they warned Lay in August and October 2001 that the Dabhol power project was overvalued and could potentially lead to a write-off of several billion dollars.

Cline maintained that Enron was always committed to regaining its $1.2 billion investment in Dabhol. The project was shuttered in June 2001, but the dispute over electricity tariffs between Enron and its only customer, the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, wasn’t resolved until June 2005.

No. 7: Marla Barnard, former Enron human-resources executive
Barnard was a human-resources supervisor at Enron’s broadband unit.

Testimony: Barnard gave similar testimony to that of fellow HR employee Sarah Davis earlier in the day. Barnard testified that, when broadband employees were moved from the unit, they were given opportunities to be reassigned or redeployed. The pair’s testimony was aimed at countering testimony from the division’s former head, Ken Rice, who told the juror that Skilling wanted layoffs to be presented publicly as redeployments so analysts would remain bullish on the venture.

No. 8: J. Mark Metts, former Enron corporate-development executive
Metts was a top mergers and acquisitions guy at Enron who handled many asset sales. He now works for law firm Jones Day. He worked on a variety of Enron deals including Enron’s purchase and subsequent sale of Portland General, and Enron’s takeover of Wessex Water in the UK.

Testimony: Metts’s testimony was aimed at proving that the relationship between Enron and the partnerships known as LJM were legit. He testified that, when he suggested to Skilling that Fastow, who ran the LJMs, was getting preferential treatment in bidding for a wind-power project, Skilling replied that he wanted Fastow to “play by the same rules.” Metts said Skilling never sought preferential treatment for the LJM partnerships in asset sales and that Fastow was livid he had suggested such a thing.

Under cross-examination by prosecutors, Metts acknowledged that he was demoted and assigned to a position under Fastow a month after that dispute with Fastow.

No. 9: Max Hendrick III, outside lawyer for Enron
Hendrick was one of the Vinson & Elkins lawyers who conducted in the fall of 2001 an investigation into issues raised by former Enron executive Sherron Watkins, who wrote her concerns in a now infamous memo to Lay.

Testimony: Hendrick told jurors that, following the monthlong probe, his firm concluded that most of Watkins’s concerns were based on gossip and financial-report footnotes. He also testified that the September 2001 investigation turned up no evidence that Watkins had been penalized for raising these issues.

No. 10: James Derrick, Enron’s former general counsel
Derrick was Enron’s former general counsel. He was the one who hired Enron’s outside law firm, Vinson & Elkins, to probe issues raised by Sherron Watkins.

Testimony: Derrick’s testimony was aimed squarely at countering prior testimony from Fastow, who had told the jury that Skilling was supposed to approve deals Enron conducted with Fastow — but didn’t. Derrick told the jury that the board required former Chief Accounting Officer Richard Causey and former Chief Risk Officer Rick Buy to review and sign off on such deals, but not Skilling.

No. 11: Jeffrey Skilling, defendant

Skilling, a graduate of Harvard Business School, joined Enron in 1990 after having advised the company as an outside consultant employed by McKinsey & Co. He served as Enron’s president and chief operating officer, helping turn the company from an old-style pipeline business into a trading giant before becoming CEO in early 2001, succeeding Lay. But Skilling resigned in August of the same year, due to a desire to spend more time with family. By that time, the company’s stock was off 49% from the start of the year.

Sentenced to over twenty-four years in prison, though his convictions were overturned and he is now appealing for the second time to the Supreme Court.

Testimony: Skilling was on the stand for seven and a half days. During direct questioning from his lawyer, Skilling said that there was no reason to break the law or mislead investors because the company was doing well. He denied masterminding conspiracy to manipulate earnings at Enron and picked off several key allegations by former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow. Skilling said he never said “Get me as much of that juice as you can,” referring to Enron side deals, as Fastow testified.

He also said that, at the time he quit Enron, he had no idea that the company would soon collapse.

“I will fight those charges until the day I die,” Skilling told jurors. “I am absolutely innocent.”

On cross-examination, Skilling sparred with prosecutor Sean Berkowitz on everything from how Enron’s reserves were used to the decision to move part of Enron’s retail-energy unit into the more profitable wholesale unit, which the government says was to hide losses.

Skilling largely held his temper, which some trial watchers half-expected during the cross. But there were a few flare-ups, such as when Berkowitz suggested that they move on to another line of questioning and Skilling replied loudly: “No, let’s not move on.”

No. 12-20: Character Witnesses
Skilling’s testimony wrapped up at lunch time on Thursday, April 20, the end of Week 12 of the trial. After the lunch break, the defense called eight character witnesses, who testified about both Skilling and Lay, sometimes generally about their character and other times about specific government allegations.

Sue Lowe, Skilling’s ex-wife, testified that she sold $14 million in Enron stock in 2001 around the same time Skilling and his current wife made sales, but denied that it was a result of a tip from Skilling. Lowe said it was because she and her current husband, a stockbroker, were worried about the market.

Carol Whalen, widow of former Enron executive and Skilling ally Cliff Baxter, testified that Skilling was an honest, law-abiding man, not a greedy criminal. She also told the jury that Skilling often did impersonations of the Saturday Night Live character Mr. Bill. Skilling said that was the voice he used to say jokingly, “They’re on to us.”

Among the other character witnesses for Skilling were: William Monteleone Jr., a Houston hotelier; Steven Keith Williams, owner of a construction company; Robert Clayton, former chief of the Houston Fire Department; Lynda Clemmons, a former Enron wholesale-unit executive; and former Enron human-relations head Cindy Olson.

Ken Lay’s former assistant, Rosalee Flemming, testified about the former Enron chairman’s character ahead of his testimony. She testified that Lay wasn’t computer literate and she never gave him a key email prosecution witness Ben Glisan said Lay received.

Joe Romano, the 20th defense witness, testified that, in late 2001 (after Skilling’s resignation), Skilling called him up in an attempt to raise the capital necessary to save Enron as it teetered on the brink of collapse. At that time, Romano said, Skilling said he was planning to invest a significant portion of his own money.

No. 21: Kenneth Lay, defendant
Lay spent time in the Navy and as US undersecretary of energy before joining a series of energy companies starting in 1974. He became CEO of Enron after the 1985 merger of Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth; the resulting company was renamed Enron. He served as CEO for 15 years before stepping aside in early 2001, and eight months later resumed the position after the resignation of Jeff Skilling. He remained CEO through the company’s bankruptcy filing and eventual unraveling.

Ms. Lay passed away before he was sentenced, and his convictions were cleared.

Testimony: Lay took the stand at the start of week 13 of the trial with his typical affable manner. He sternly denied that he had broken the law and went so far as to say that there was no conspiracy at Enron. He described the allegations as “the American nightmare.”

No. 22-33: Lay Character, Expert Witnesses
Some of Houston’s most prominent figures took the stand on behalf of Lay, who was involved in many charitable and civic functions around the city. The witnesses included: former Houston Mayor Bob Lanier; Houston Astros owner Drayton McLane; Rev. William Lawson of Wheeler Avenue Baptist Church in Houston, who described Lay’s generosity to the black community; retired Navy Admiral George E.R. Kinnear Jr., whom Lay worked with at the Pentagon; and New York attorney Martin Siegel.

Next up were Enron’s “expert” witnesses. Two accountants testified that Enron properly described write-downs, a business reorganization and booked reserves. They were Jerry Arnold, an accounting professor at the University of Southern California. The other accountant was Walter Rush, who was a former PricewaterhouseCoopers partner.

Christopher Barry, chairman of the finance department at Texas Christian University testified that Lay’s nearly exclusive reliance on Enron in his stock portfolio reflected his over-confidence in the company. By early 2001, Lay’s portfolio was 90% Enron. The witness was aimed at countering the prosecution’s claim that Lay’s Enron stock sales indicated a lack of confidence in Enron.

Marge Nadasky, a former Enron manager of corporate identity and branding who dealt with PhotoFete.com, testified that she didn’t know that Lay and Skilling had invested in the company and that she approved Enron’s contract with PhotoFete, but was never pressured to do so.

The final defense witness was Ed Young, a minister at the Second Baptist Church of Houston, who said Lay was trustworthy and a good friend.

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Prosecution Witnesses in the Skilling/Lay Trial

No. 1: Mark Koenig, head of Enron investor relations

Enron’s former head of investor relations, Koenig worked with top executives on quarterly conference calls with analysts. He prepared the company’s earnings statements and worked with top executives on conference calls with analysts. He revised his plea agreement to attribute to Mr. Skilling a statement that Mr. Koenig originally said he made on a 2001 call to mislead analysts about why Enron folded its money-losing retail energy unit into the company’s profitable trading unit.

Status: Pleaded guilty in August 2004 to one count of aiding and abetting securities fraud and agreed to cooperate with prosecutors. Sentenced to eighteen months.

Testimony: Koenig testified that Enron’s earnings were sometimes changed at the last minute to keep Wall Street happy and that both Skilling and Lay knew about it. He also said that the executives either made or approved of misleading statements to the public about problems at Enron’s retail-energy and broadband units.

No. 2: Kenneth Rice, head of Enron’s broadband unit

Ken Rice was a close ally of Jeff Skilling and part of Enron’s old guard of dealmakers. A former Enron trader, Rice was tapped in the late 1990s to be co-head of the company’s Broadband unit. He testified during the 2005 trial of five former broadband executives that he, Skilling and others lied to investors and analysts about capabilities of Enron’s broadband network to inflate company stock.

Status: Rice pleaded guilty in July 2004 to one count of securities fraud and forfeited $13.7 million in cash and property. Sentenced to twenty-seven months in prison.

Testimony: Rice testified that Skilling told analysts that the broadband unit could survive even when “it was flailing.”

No. 3: Terry West, Enron accountant
Terry West, the prosecution’s third witness, is an Enron accountant and former director of corporate planning. She joined the company in 1981, when it was a relatively small pipeline business known as Houston Natural Gas.

Testimony: West was the first accounting professional to testify and her testimony was very brief. Her primary role was to present budget documents (i.e., get them on the record as evidence) and explain the mechanics of how the company developed spending and profit plans that resulted in annual earnings-per-share growth of 15%. She testified that one time she changed estimated earnings on orders from higher ups.

No. 4: Paula Rieker, investor-relations executive, board secretary

Paula Rieker was the former No. 2 executive in investor relations and corporate secretary for the board.

Status: Pleaded guilty to insider trading for selling shares in mid-2001 upon learning that Enron’s broadband unit lost more money than publicly disclosed. Sentenced to two years probation.

Testimony: Rieker turned the trial’s focus to Lay for the first time, telling jurors that Lay downplayed or hid bad news from Wall Street in the months leading to Enron’s collapse, though acknowledged that she sent him a note in November 2001, calling his leadership “invaluable.” Board members were “outraged” when they learned that Lay had repaid $70 million in loans with Enron stock, even as the stock spiraled, she said, quoting one member, John Duncan, as saying, “He was using Enron like a damn ATM machine!”

No. 5: Wesley Colwell, former top accountant at Enron’s trading unit

Wesley Colwell was the top accountant at Enron’s profitable trading division from 1999-2002. For the prior 17 years, he worked at accounting firm Arthur Andersen, which collapsed along with Enron.

Status: In October 2003, paid a $500,000 fine to settle SEC civil allegations that he manipulated Enron’s earnings. Lost his CPA license and is barred from being an officer in a public company. He reached a plea agreement with the Justice Department, which requires that he testify to avoid criminal prosecution.

Testimony: Colwell said that he improperly raided Enron’s reserves to increase earnings in mid-2000 when he learned that Skilling wanted to beat Wall Street forecasts. However, he didn’t overtly say that Skilling had ordered him to do so.

No. 6: Wanda Curry, former Enron accountant

Wanda Curry, the prosecution’s sixth witness, was an in-house accountant who worked for Enron for 22 years. She was assigned to analyze billing and losses in the company’s retail division.

Status: Never charged with a crime.

Testimony: Curry talked about overvalued contracts and millions in uncashed checks at Enron’s retail energy-services unit. She teared up as she described how she felt discriminated against by Enron bosses for pushing for honest financial accounting.

No. 7: Timothy Belden, West Coast energy trader
Timothy Belden ran Enron’s Western power-trading desk in Portland, Oregon in 2000 and 2001.

Status: Pleaded guilty in October 2002 to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Sentenced to two years probation.

Testimony: Belden said that California’s “dysfunctional” market in the aftermath of electricity deregulation left it ripe for high prices. He said Enron pocketed nearly $1 billion over nine months in late 2000 and the first half of 2001. His testimony may be best known for drawing this distinction: price volatility — not volume increases — was the primary factor in Enron’s huge electricity-trading profits.

On cross-examination, Belden frequently sparred with defense lawyers, refusing to accept the defense’s argument that trading profits were due to unit volumes.

No. 8: David Delainey, former head of Enron Energy Services
David Delainey rose swiftly through the ranks at Enron, leading Enron’s profitable wholesale energy-trading unit before being tapped to head the retail energy-services unit.

Status: Pleaded guilty to insider trading. Sentenced to two and a half years in prison.

Testimony: Delainey said the wholesale energy-trading unit built reserves and used them to “smooth” its volatile results. He said that Enron misled outsiders about the sizeable risks in its trading operations, adding: “we tended to be pretty fast and loose with the rules, generally.”

As for the retail energy-services unit, Delainey testified that, contrary to management claims that it was one of Enron’s growth areas, the unit was “a basket case” when he was handed the reins in 2001. He described a meeting with Skilling and others in which he felt pressure from his bosses to go along with a plan to hide retail losses by transferring the stressed unit into the healthy wholesale business.

“We lied to shareholders, employees, the public,” Delainey testified. “It was just plain wrong.”

No. 9: John Sides, Enron accountant
John Sides, 52 years old, was a rank-and-file employee who worked at Enron for nearly 22 years. His 401(k) was heavily invested in Enron stock and was destroyed by the company’s collapse.

Status: Never charged with a crime.

Testimony: Sides testified that, in October 2001, he bought Enron stock on two different occasions following pep talks Lay gave to employees. He testified about the collapse of his retirement fund, but wasn’t allowed to tell jurors how much wealth he lost as per a pretrial ruling prohibiting such testimony as too inflammatory.

“Basically, we [employees] were told articles in the newspaper were rumor and we should look to management for information about the company,” Sides told jurors.

No. 10: Kevin Hannon, ex-operating chief of Enron Broadband
Kevin Hannon was Ken Rice’s former deputy at Enron’s wholesale-trading and broadband units. He delivered one of the biggest blockbuster quotes in the first five weeks of the trial.

Status: Pleaded guilty to conspiracy for scheming with Rice and others to inflate Enron’s broadband network capabilities to Wall Street. Agreed to testify under a plea deal with the government. Sentenced to two years in prison.

Testimony: Hannon described to jurors a meeting at a hotel in May 2001. At that meeting, executives discussed a report from an analyst who suggested that Enron stock should be valued at less than half the $60 a share it was worth at the time, and questioned Enron’s profit-making practices. Hannon testified that Skilling’s response to the report was, “They’re on to us.” Though, on cross-examination, Hannon conceded that the remark may have been intended sarcastically.

Hannon also recounted a disclosure by Fastow about the outside partnerships known as LJM that did a lot of business with Enron. Fastow allegedly told the group, “LJM is a good deal for me.” The remark, said Hannon, “was met by stunned silence.”

No. 11: Andrew Fastow, former Enron CFO

Fastow was hired at Enron by Skilling in 1990, and became CFO in March 1998. Over the next several years, Fastow created off-balance-sheet partnerships that put him at the center of the firm’s most controversial deals. He was forced out in October 2001, just before the company’s collapse.

Status: In January 2004, he pleaded guilty to two criminal counts — of a 98-count indictment — and agreed to a 10-year sentence in return for his cooperation in future trials. Sentenced to six years in prison. His wife, Lea, completed a one-year prison sentence in July 2005 for filing a false tax return. The government has seized nearly $30 million from the Fastows.

Testimony: Fastow was on the stand for four days. He testified that he ran partnerships that hid huge losses at Enron and boosted earnings, with Skilling’s blessing. Of those deals, he quoted Skilling as saying, “Get me as much of that juice as you can.” He also testified about a master list, known as “Global Galactic,” that he once wrote to keep track of the deals. Day two of his testimony put the focus squarely on Lay. Fastow testified that Lay knew about Enron’s financial woes in 2001, just days before he gave an interview that said the company was in its best shape ever. On cross-examination, he admitted to lying to Lay over the money he admitted stealing from the company.

No. 12: Christopher Loehr, former employee of Enron, LJM

Christopher Loehr started working for Enron in his mid-twenties as an investment analyst. Enron paid his salary, but most of his work was for Fastow’s LJM partnerships. Loehr kept two offices – one for Enron and one for LJM – “in order to keep up appearances that his work was separate”, according to reports from the Houston Chronicle.

Status: Struck an immunity deal with prosecutors.

Testimony: Loehr was brought in to corroborate Fastow’s testimony that Enron improperly used partnerships to make earnings seem better than they actually were. He supported Fastow’s allegations, but never mentioned Lay or Skilling by name, and defense lawyers on cross-examination said the analyst was at too low a level to know how the LJM deals were actually negotiated.

No. 13: Johnnie Nelson, Enron pipeline worker
Johnnie Nelson, 46 years old, was a career Enron pipeline worker from Bloomfield, New Mexico who had all of his retirement savings in Enron stock.

Status: Never charged with a crime.

Testimony: Nelson testified that he lost his retirement savings when Enron collapsed and pointedly accused Lay of misleading workers. He said that he had previously diversified his holdings, but decided to keep it all in Enron stock after Lay’s assertion at a 2001 employee meeting that the company was going to bounce back. On cross-examination, an attorney for Lay asked Nelson whether Lay had done anything to violate the law, to which Nelson replied, “He violated my trust. That’s all I know.”

No. 14: Vince Kaminski, head of risk and research at Enron
Vince Kaminski, 58 years old, is a mathematician and economist. His job at Enron was to monitor its business deals and assess risk.

Status: Never charged with a crime.

Testimony: Kaminski testified that he tried to do his job, warning executives of what he believed was excessive risk in the LJMs and Raptors, but was met with resistance. He said his allegations of LJM1 conflicts got him booted from the risk unit.

Kaminski described one incident, at an October 2001 management meeting headed by Lay, in which he, Kaminski, was cut off and escorted off the podium when he said, that Fastow’s actions were “not only improper, but terminally stupid” and suggested that Enron should “come clean.” After the meeting, Kaminski received a call from HR, which caused him concern that he might be fired.

On cross-examination, he described an email he sent to Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur Anderson sarcastically wrote, “Accounting 001: One cannot eat the cake and have it too.” When challenged by one of Lay’s lawyers that he wasn’t addressing accounting students in that email, Kaminski replied that, in some instances, executives may have “needed some remedial accounting classes, just have some common sense.”

No. 15: Sherron Watkins, former Enron Global Finance executive and company VP

During her time at Enron Global Finance, Watkins reported to Fastow. Before Enron, she had been an auditor Arthur Andersen.

Watkins has proved key to the government’s investigation, telling Congress in early 2002 that Fastow and Skilling were likely to blame for Enron’s fall and winning praise for her convictions.

Status: Never charged with a crime, despite repeated admissions of insider trading.

Testimony: Watkins testified about the infamous 2001 memo to Lay in which she warned him about suspicious deals that could lead Enron to “implode in a wave of accounting scandals,” and then a subsequent meeting with Lay. “He seemed surprised that these things could be problematic,” Watkins told jurors, adding that he winced when she discussed certain concerns.

She testified about the off-balance-sheet financial structures known as the Raptors, which carried loads of debt and were backed by Enron stock, saying, “Accounting just doesn’t get that creative.”

No. 16: John R. Sult, former accountant for Arthur Andersen
John R. Sult oversaw accounting for Wessex Water Ltd., a British water utility that was part of Enron’s multibillion-dollar water business, Azurix.

Status: Never charged with a crime.

Testimony: Sult testified about the fact that Enron officials claimed they were planning to spend well over $1 billion to expand its water business, thus helping it to avoid a huge write-down for the business. Sult also testified that Lay misled analysts during a conference call about the status of Andersen’s review of the water business. Lay said that Andersen’s review concluded that a huge write-down wasn’t necessary, when in fact, Andersen’s review at the time was still “preliminary and incomplete.”

No. 17: Thomas Bauer, former accountant for Arthur Andersen
Bauer oversaw the books for Enron’s profitable trading arm, Enron North America. Referred to by some as Andersen’s “shredder-in-chief,” Bauer was among several auditors disciplined for the tons of Enron-related audit documents and emails that were destroyed.

Status: Never charged with a crime. During Andersen’s obstruction of justice trial in 2002, Bauer invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.

Testimony: Bauer testified that Andersen auditors were unaware that Enron was using its huge reserves to boost earnings, and that if the auditors had seen documentation of such activity, they would’ve curbed the practice. “Reserves can’t have any role to hit an earnings target. It’s an asset to cover a liability, period,” Bauer testified.

No. 18: Ron Barone, managing director at Standard & Poor’s
Ron Barone is a credit analyst at Standard & Poor’s.

Status: Never charged with a crime.

Testimony: Barone testified about a phone call he received from Lay in October 2001, which Barone said likely headed off a potential reduction in Enron’s credit rating. The call came right after Enron disclosed an unexpected accounting adjustment of $1.2 billion. Barone said he told Lay that a larger write-down could trigger a credit-rating downgrade. Lay acknowledged the company’s deteriorating financial position, according to Barone, but assured him that there were no more surprises. Lay added, however, that he “still wanted his financial staff to be creative,” Barone testified.

Prosecutors maintain that Lay hid Enron’s true financial troubles from debt-rating agencies to preserve the company’s credit rating.

No. 19: Ben Glisan, former Enron treasurer

Ben Glisan Jr., the prosecution’s final witness, was Enron’s former Treasurer and chief architect of the Raptors. The Raptors were four LJM2-related entities created in 2000 that were backed by Enron stock and, he claimed, wrongly treated as independent of Enron.

Glisan has been described as a popular figure at Enron; Skilling once said he had the reputation of a “boy scout.”

Status: Glisan was the first Enron executive to go to prison. Sentenced to five years in prison.

Testimony: Outside the jury’s presence, Glisan invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked if he committed any other crimes while at Enron.

Glisan then testified that Enron’s financial condition was “weak” on the day that Skilling resigned. The prosecution then played tapes of Lay and Skilling from that same day, offering an upbeat assessment of the company’s condition and outlook. When asked if Lay and Skilling were aware of the problems, Glisan replied, “Yes, they were.”

No. 20: Glenn Ray, stockbroker at Charles Schwab
Glenn Ray, a Denver-based Charles Schwab stockbroker, handled Skilling’s sale of Enron stock a month after he’d resigned as CEO of the company.

Status: Never charged with a crime.

Testimony: Ray testified that Skilling placed an order to sell 200,000 shares on September 6, 2001. That sale was stopped pending a letter from Enron verifying that Skilling was no longer an officer of the company, to ensure that this wouldn’t qualify as insider trading.

Then the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks occurred and the market was closed for six days. Skilling’s order never went through. On September 17, the first day the market opened after the attacks, Skilling placed an order for 500,000 — of his 936,576 — shares. On a tape of the transaction played in court, Skilling is heard saying, “”I don’t like it [the market's drop] … I’d like to sell 500,000 Enron shares.”

No. 21: Robert Martin, FBI agent
Robert Martin is an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, who reviewed many Enron documents.

Status: Never charged with a crime

Testimony: Martin testified about the advances Lay took on his credit line. He testified about the bank account where those advances were deposited and the bank withdrawals made by the Lays to pay off their home mortgage.

No. 22: Joanne Cortez, former Enron employee
Joanne Cortez was a former Enron employee who oversaw the line of credit Enron provided to Lay.

Status: Never charged with a crime.

Testimony: Cortez testified about the transactions Lay made with Enron. She talked about the size of the credit line, and the fact that the board agreed to increase the credit line to $7.5 million in October 2001, just before the company collapsed. She said he used to pay back the credit with Enron stock and the decision to raise the amount upset her. She said she didn’t sell her own Enron shares based on what she knew about Lay’s deals because she didn’t think it was right.

Lay’s credit-line transactions were not part of the indictment, but the government used them to demonstrate to the jury that Lay knew there were problems at Enron and was cashing out.

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ePower Online PowerPoint: Introduction To Enron Communications

This ECI PowerPoint presentation was created on September 7, 1999. It’s a clear, easy to understand sales and marketing document.

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