Monthly Archives: June 2010

Lea Fastow and Blackstone’s Ratio

Perhaps you are familiar with Blackstone’s ratio, the principle that that “it is better ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer”. Other great minds have uttered similar statements and it is consecrated in our culture as a fundamental truth. Guilty men can go free and might harm again (OJ Simpson springs to mind) but an innocent man in prison is an atrocity that as a culture and a civilized people, we can not tolerate.

It was Blackstone’s ratio that I thought of when I saw this snippet from John Kroger’s book, Convictions:

Lea Fastow wouldn’t have had to go to prison if her husband had talked. The mind reels.

Marriage is a sacred institution but no union can make one’s punishment or rewards transferable. In other words, just because we are married, we are still individuals. Lea’s guilt or innocence has nothing to do with Andy Fastow, who had to consider his own well-being. And likewise, Andy should not have been in the position of choosing between a longer sentence for himself vs. a shorter sentence for his wife.

This statement by John Kroger is nothing less than inhuman.

Lea Fastow was a mother with two young children. The only thing she did was sign a tax return. For the government to take a mother from her children as punishment for her husband not talking – regardless of her innocence, as Kroger concedes here – is truly monstrous. If they will do this, they will do anything.

I find it fascinating that the title of Kroger’s book is Convictions. I realize the double meaning – a firm belief and a formal declaration of guilt. But Kroger doesn’t spend any time in the book examining what his convictions are. Indeed, he only relishes the discussion of sending people to prison, and the various machinations to get them there. Based on hundreds of interviews, and his own words, I believe John Kroger is a sociopath and a tyrant as evil as Pol Pot, dressed up like a law professor. He thirsts for power, specifically generated by others’ defeat.

The men he’s attacked are strong, and they’ve managed to survive. But an innocent mother taken from her children? How could he be so cruel?

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John Kroger Is Disappointing His Coworkers

This OregonLive article reveals that John Kroger’s leadership skills as AG in Oregon are less that sterling.

But now, his own staff was giving him low marks.

“The front office is more interested in good publicity than quality of legal work,” wrote one assistant attorney general in an unprecedented survey of Justice Department lawyers.

“The advent of John Kroger was at first invigorating, but now dispiriting,” wrote another, lamenting low morale.

Kroger, affable yet resolved, was taken aback by the in-house criticism, which his office released to The Oregonian under open-records laws.

“I was kind of depressed. … A lot of it was my own fault,” Kroger said, acknowledging failures to adequately explain departmental changes to his staff as he centralized decision making previously spread throughout the agency’s various divisions.

As his first months unfolded, he lost key people, sometimes in controversial ways. He went after corrupt public officials but cut deals that later were questioned as something never done before at the Justice Department [I am sure Ken Rice, Kevin Hannon, and Joe Hirko can fill in the citizens of Oregon about his nasty "deals" -- CE.] He got money for his favorite projects but watched legislators whittle away at one of the agency’s most crucial tasks — defending criminal convictions.

Poor John Kroger. He’s the little prosecutor who couldn’t.

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Googlelicious: Searching The Enron Task Force

I am pleased that I’m on the front page of several of the ETF’s google results. It warms my cold, cold heart. Or it would if I had a heart.

I have to say I’m more than a little amused that google picked up my break up letter instead of any of the other Berkowitz posts. But that’s just as well, I think. I rather like having that as the fourth link.

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Guilty: The Enron Task Force’s Underhanded Methodology For Securing Convictions

Starting with the Skilling / Lay trial, the ETF preferred to group defendants together, creating a Prisoner’s dilemma, a game theory problem that demonstrates why two people might not cooperate even if it’s in their best interest to do so.

If you’ve never seen the prisoner’s dilemma, you can see it on every single Law & Order ever made. If you’ve never seen Law & Order, go up to any television, any random time of the day, on any random channel, and you will see Law & Order. More formally put, from the Wikipedia website:

Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having separated the prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal. If one testifies for the prosecution against the other (defects) and the other remains silent (cooperates), the defector goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the other would not know about the betrayal before the end of the investigation. How should the prisoners act?

So basically the ETF would use this strategy, putting pressure on defendants to turn on each other. To convict Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay, they used:

Andy Fastow
Ken Rice
Mark Koenig
Ben Glisan
Kevin Hannon
Rick Causey
Timothy Belden
Jeffrey Richter
Larry Lawyer
John Forney
Dave Delainey
Timothy Despain

To convict Andy Fastow they used Lea Fastow.

Ben Glisan, Michael Kopper, and Andy Fastow turned on each other, and then on Skilling as they attempted to get a good deal for themselves.

To attempt to convict Rex Shelby, Scott Yeager, and Joe Hirko, they used Ken Rice. They also wrote in their 302 notes that Scott Yeager blamed everything on Joe, and Joe blamed everything on Scott. This was NOT TRUE. Neither man blamed the other for anything, but the government’s strategy was to turn every defendant on the others he was indicted with. Thankfully, neither man rose to the bait; they were too principled.

In the Nigerian Barge trial, they used Ben Glisan to go after the Merrill Lynch bankers and an Enron mid-level executive, plus an accountant who was acquitted.

It’s no surprise, of course, that prosecutors use prosecution witnesses, but what does surprise me about the Enron cases is that each prosecution was so nakedly for the purpose of getting someone else.

John Kroger said in his book that he indicted Ken Rice and Kevin Hannon for the specific purpose of getting them to flip and testify against Jeff Skilling. That’s all well and good, but what if Ken Rice and Kevin Hannon hadn’t done anything wrong? That hardly seemed to matter. There were witches to burn, damnit, and he was going to burn them. If two innocent men with children had to go to prison, so be it.

Something else began to emerge the closer I looked. The government was accusing defendants of conspiring together – people they didn’t even know or like! In Broadband, for instance, Rex Shelby, Scott Yeager, Ken Rice and Joe Hirko – the technology defendants – were not friends. They never had an after-work drink or emailed funny jokes. They were all business. And Ken and Joe had a bit of a strained relationship, so why would they conspire together? Over in the financial side, Kevin Howard wasn’t exactly best man at Krautz’s wedding. They worked together. That was it. So why would these people who didn’t even know each other very well conspire together? Why would they trust each other?

The phenomenon wasn’t confined to Broadband. One former defendant told me he’d met one of his co-defendants exactly four times. Yet he was supposed to have conspired, in those scant meetings, to do something criminal.

The NatWest bankers worked in the same group together, but like the Nigerian Barge, Corporate, and Broadband defendants, they didn’t spend time together outside of work.

Timothy Despain turned on Jeff McMahon, who was named an “unindicted co-conspirator” and McMahon barely knew the guy.

So why would all these disparate groups decide quite spontaneously to start committing multiple felonies with complete strangers?

They wouldn’t.

Furthermore, why would these men who had spent their lives working and achieving spontaneously throw it all away, all at the same time?

Not to put too fine a point on it, but most of the executives were not hurting for money. Many of them (most, in fact) had made millions before they ever heard of Enron. So why would they suddenly “get greedy”?

Imagine a group of forty men. I’ll eye-ball their median age as 42, average them married with at least one child, and worth at the minimum six figures. So these forty men, who have never had any criminal record, suddenly begin to conspire with their coworkers. All in the same company at the same time. Why would they do that? How would they even approach each other? Did Ken Rice leave his desk, meet Joe in the hallway, and suggest they get together this afternoon to start lying about the software? Did Jeff Skilling approach Ken Lay and say, “I have been at this company ten years. I think it’s time we started lying to analysts and making real money.” That makes exactly no sense at all.

Nothing about the prosecution’s case makes any sense. They spin these outlandish theories that no serious thinking person can believe.

The worst thing about the prosecutions is that these men are good men. They are the achievers, the smart, the funny, the enlightened. They laugh with their wives; they are silly and sweet and shockingly gentle. They haven’t a criminal bone in their body.

They aren’t guilty.

Curiously, it is much easier to believe a group of twelve ambitious lawyers, in the glare of the media spotlight, railroading the executives. Prosecutors are worse than guilty. They are an abomination.

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Krogerwatch

A few days ago I posted a note that I received from someone asking about John Kroger. Victoria Taft is the author of said note and she’s not happy with Kroger. Her blog is mostly political, but it is nice to know that others are watching John Kroger’s descent into insanity as closely as I.

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Sherron Watkins Weighs In On Skilling’s Supreme Court Decision

Oh, it’s like a kiss from Jesus! Insider trader and perennial whistleblower/victim Sherron Watkins has emerged from obscurity once again to give us her opinion of Jeff Skilling’s Supreme Court win.

I know, I know. If you’re anything like me, it’s almost so good you can barely stand it. I absolutely love Sherron Watkins because she reminds me of everything I do not want to be. She’s a camera-seducing, microphone-licking, attention-seeking trainwreck, like watching Courtney Love trying to do calculus. You feel sorry for her, but it’s just so funny and wrong that you just can’t look away.

Anyway, Miss Sherron bestows us thusly with her knowledge:

Remember Enron? Remember the 24-year prison sentence that was meant to discourage similar corporate malfeasance?

Sorry, I’m drawing a blank here. All I remember is a vindictive Enron Task Force pursing anyone with an E on their resume with the intent to destroy their lives. You might recall that because you were part of that lynch mob. Or have you forgotten?

Well, this past week, Jeff Skilling, Enron’s former CEO and my former boss—

Had to squeeze that in there, didn’t you. No, Sherron, it is painfully obvious that you need Jeff Skilling. You need him to give yourself credibility. Jeff wasn’t your direct boss. You worked for Andy Fastow and then, toward the end, Cindy Olsen. But by using Jeff’s name, you hope to attract the fission of interest because you simply can’t do it on your own.

who was convicted and sentenced to more than two decades behind bars in 2006—won a partial victory in an appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court.

The appeal, however, is not likely to spring Skilling from his prison cell in Colorado. Even if he gets some convictions tossed, federal sentencing guidelines will probably keep him behind bars for at least another decade, given the size of Enron’s multibillion-dollar financial collapse.

Which you desperately need to maintain any kind of relevance. Jeff Skilling created thousands of jobs at Enron. Yours was one of them. And it seems to me, you’re making money off him still. You need him in prison so you can find a camera and do that sad head shake, and talk about how “he had to know what Andy was doing.” Don’t you ever get tired of this song and dance?

But the appeal—and recent financial-reform push—has set me thinking, once again, about how we deter the next generation of corporate miscreants, especially now that a new financial-reform bill is making its way through Congress.

I literally laughed out loud at this. Suddenly you are in a position to lecture us on the financial reform bill? Since when are you interested in the goings-on in Washington? Oh you’re really straining to make some kind of connection here – a way to mention Enron and keep your name in the news while pretending to talk about something else. This is called a head fake, coined by Randy Pausch and I am on to you.

By now, after the fallout from executive overreach/malfeasance/gambling at Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and AIG—even after Skilling—it is clear that lengthy prison sentences do not do the trick. The convictions of the Enron CEO and other executives from our scandal-plagued start of the century have, ultimately, been ineffective warnings to the corporate daredevils, and, later, bailout recipients.
At the heart of Enron’s meltdown, and the recent Wall Street collapses, is a single issue: compensation systems run amok.

You’re a moron. You mentioned this before so I suppose I ought to be glad you’ve finally developed a meme for yourself. But you’re still way, way off base.

Let’s start with you. You were very well compensated and you admitted, under oath, that you traded on insider information. Why did you do that? Were you not making enough money? Is it because of your greed? Did you need MORE money? No, let me guess, you’re about to make the case that executives should make far less. But it begs the question: WHO THE FUCK ARE YOU TO TELL ANYONE ELSE WHAT TO MAKE?

In the case of Skilling, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s use of an anti-fraud law known as “theft of honest services” and sent his case back to the appellate court to consider the impact on his multiple convictions.

“The government charges Skilling with conspiring to defraud Enron’s shareholders by misrepresenting the company’s fiscal health to his own profit, but the government never alleged that he solicited or accepted side payments from a third party in exchange for making these misrepresentations,” the high court said in its recent ruling.

My question to the government is this: What constitutes a modern-day bribe or kickback? Is a perpetrator off the hook because he or she uses the market to pay the kickback?

Look you egotistical maniac, they’re the Supreme Court. I don’t like a lot of the crap they do but I do accept the argument that as far as the law goes, they know better than most of us. Compensation, as Petrocelli answered during the appeal at the Fifth Circuit, has never been considered a way to deprive a company or shareholders of honest services. Or don’t you keep up with the Skilling case?

In 1993, Congress passed a law disallowing tax deductions for compensation in excess of $1 million. This new law was an attempt at reining in CEO pay; instead, it fueled the use of stock options to compensate executives for the loss of their salary above $1 million.

Boo hoo.

As COO and then CEO, Jeff Skilling was both contractor, builder, and owner of various stock-option and stock-grant plans put in place for his benefit as well as other Enron executives and employees. In the U.S. government’s indictment of Skilling, he was accused of hiding Enron’s true financial condition in the years 1998 through 2001 by using various means to fill the “gap” between actual results and budgeted goals, all the while benefiting from this deception by selling stock and options in the marketplace that netted him more than $89 million in profit.

Sound familiar to those reading the Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy Examiner’s reports?

In 2002, in the wake of the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, HealthSouth, and others, Congress again focused on the issue of compensation and the use of stock options.

In congressional testimony to the Committee on Financial Services, Paul Volcker said this as early as June 2003:

“I think it is clear that the grotesque escalation of executive pay over recent years has been importantly a function of the greatly expanded use of fixed-price stock options for a small group of senior executives,” he said. “That development has been encouraged and defended by the theory that such options align the interests of managers and owners… Experience provides ample evidence that the relationship between reward and performance is capricious.”

Well the Supreme Court said otherwise, so go find a tub of Haggen Daaz, put on House, and relax, because you’re not gonna change the definition of “bribe” or “kickback” on a Daily Beast blog post.

The business world erupted in protest at any legislative inquiry into compensation practices, and Congress eventually settled for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an overhaul bill focused primarily on accounting. Given the enormity of the Wall Street collapses of 2008, it would appear Sarbanes-Oxley was ineffective.

How on earth do you blame Sarbanes-Oxley for the housing collapse? This is a nonsensical allegation.

And sadly, current financial reform does not get to the root of the problem, either.

The fix is simple, but not pain-free: Repeal the 1993 law and allow corporations to deduct all corporate salaries, even those above $1 million. Then require CEO compensation to be all cash—no stock options. Eliminating the use of stock options for the CEO and the C-class executives solves the problem.

That would work for you because as we know, you’re a criminal with stock options. But honest executives don’t need that stupid rule. Executives should be permitted to own stock in their own companies; it incentivizes them and frankly it is none of your business, or mine, or Washington’s what any person is making and how they make it.

In terms of Enron, the story is over. Skilling’s plight and fight are of little interest; he’s been in prison for the last 3.5 years, with many more to follow. He’s paying for his crimes with his freedom and his money. He destroyed $60 billion of shareholder capital, wrecked the lives of thousands of Enron employees, and, in some cases, indirectly caused untimely deaths.

That’s it, you bitch. You are a liar, a criminal, and you’ve just barely managed to phrase that in a way that isn’t slanderous, but you owe Jeff an apology, and you should retract that sentence.

You’re too afraid to name names? Are you talking about Cliff Baxter? Cliff didn’t kill himself because of Jeff. You’re just absolutely despicable to accuse him of “indirectly causing untimely deaths.” That’s beyond the pale.

Even if he prevails at the appellate court and is released, his life’s work will be considered a failure, and so will
he.

No. Jeff Skilling is a success. Jeff Skilling has done nothing to be ashamed of. Jeff Skilling can close his eyes at night and rest peacefully, knowing in his soul he did nothing wrong. You, however, should at least have the sense to be humiliated by your own lecherous behavior.

More importantly—and depressingly—than the individual fate of Skilling is the fact that, seemingly, we’ve learned nothing from the rash of corporate scandals from Enron and onward.

Oh sigh. Hey, did you pay the Enron Compensation Fund the money you illegally made on your stock sales?

Enron was Ebola in a Petri dish, and, instead of stamping out the virus, we let it fester.

Purple prose, anyone?

Why hasn’t Congress had the courage to address compensation abuse head-on? We’ve had abusive corporate practices in our past that were successfully addressed by Congress; such as monopoly abuse, child labor, environmental pollution, and worker safety.

Oh yes, Government, please take care of every aspect of our business lives, we’re too stupid to do it ourselves, boo hoo.

The trouble with compensation abuse

No, we’re not making “compensation abuse” a “thing” now. No.

is that we—as a society—are envious first, and only outraged later, when we hear the story of yet another lucky executive who bankrupts a company, and walks out the door with multiple millions in his pocket.

Oh you just made a deep diagonal across the chess board, and I’m about to rape your queen.

See, Sherron, most people don’t feel “envy” at the millions that executives make. We feel happy and proud. We feel inspired to work harder so we can one day make that kind of money. We redouble our efforts. But you clearly do feel envy, and I am sorry for you. I am sorry you can’t see monied people and be inspired by them. I think you’re petty.

And the little bio at the end:

Sherron Watkins is the former vice president of Enron Corp. who alerted then-CEO Ken Lay in August 2001 to accounting irregularities within the company. Time magazine named her as one of their 2002 Persons of the Year. Watkins is co-author with Mimi Swartz of Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron.

She did not alert Ken Lay. She said there was a PR problem.

Oh and I guess it makes me small for noticing but the photo she is using on the article of herself is about 15 years old.

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Enron’s Gas Bank

Jeffrey Skilling was a thirty-six year old consultant at McKinsey & Co., making six figures and on his way somewhere in life. While at McKinsey, incidentally, he would get to know Rex Shelby and numerous other future Enron folks. But in 1989, Skilling was a hotshot consultant with a big idea for a client, this “Enron” company: the gas bank.

The gas bank was a process by which Enron would buy gas from a network of suppliers and sell it to a network of consumers, contractually guaranteeing both the supply and the price, charging fees for the transactions and assuming the associated risks. This would later be known as an energy derivative.

When Jeff pitched the idea to Rich Kinder it was met with excitement, but their success was slow to come. The buyers loved it because they could obtain a predictable price for gas. But gas producers were reluctant to buy in. Gas was very cheap and producers believed the price would rise. Why would they sell cheaper gas today instead of waiting until tomorrow when they’d get a better price?

Confronted with the seemingly intractable problem, Jeff had another brainstorm. He would buy the gas on the spot market. The idea was a good one but it still needed some refinement. So Jeff did something brilliant.

He realized that Enron did not have to deliver gas to its customers. It could guarantee the price of gas to the customer and allow someone else to deliver it. So if the gas price rose, Enron would buy the expensive gas, and the client could then sell it at the higher price. If the price dived, the client would pay Enron the difference. Enron would be guaranteeing the price of gas, not delivering the gas.

He also got money in the form of loans into the hands of oil drillers. So he set up Enron Finance Corporation to handle the credit requests. Many years later, at trial, Jeff would describe this time in the Texas economy as a desolate era with “shotgun” buildings – empty buildings you could shoot through and not hit anything.

In 1989, Rich Kinder asked Jeff to join Enron and take over the whole gas bank operation. Skilling said not only no, but hell no. Things were going well for him at McKinsey. But Rich – and then Dr. Lay – kept after him and in the spring, he finally agreed to come aboard Enron. He would be CEO of Enron Finance.

With his new title and new job, he needed some finance talent, someone knowledgeable about securitization who would be able to push the loans to the gas industry.

Enter Andy Fastow.

Andy Fastow was a banker in Chicago who had already built a solid reputation in securitization. He was, Jeff thought, the guy he had been looking for.

Andy’s first job at Enron was a project called Cactus. This is how it worked:

1. Enron would create a contract.
a. The contract would represent a supply of gas that could be sold on the spot market at variable prices.
b. It would advance payment for an agreed amount of gas over a specified period of time.

2. Enron would pool all the contracts.

3. Enron would sell stakes to institutional investors.

4. Enron would use the money from the fund to pay gas producers.

This was the fully realized gas bank. But an accounting curiosity quickly emerged. It required a different type of accounting on both sides of the transaction. This irrational gas-rules accounting vexed Skilling, who believed that it would be smarter and make more sense to use mark to market.

Mark to market accounting means that you value an asset at the current market price, and any fluctuations – positive or negative – are taken at the end of the transaction. (Example: If I sell you a contract worth $10 and the value diminishes, I can hold the $10 on my books until I sell it for $7.)

The gas bank became a brilliant success. Jeff Skilling had almost singlehandedly created a futures market in which Enron would be paid on both sides of the deal, for billions of transactions.

The gas bank ultimately became Enron Capital and Trade.

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Three Percent

One of the repeated complaints I hear about LJM and other special-purpose vehicles is that only three percent of liquidity came from other investors for the investment to conform to GAAP and be legitimately separate from Enron. This always amazes me for two reasons. The first is, that’s the law. Enron didn’t create the law. Enron was only doing what the law demanded. The second is the more salient point.

Three percent is what a buyer must put down for a Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac mortgage. Sometimes you don’t even need three percent. So if you’re in a home or car or any other asset in which you paid only three percent down, you are automatically disqualified from complaining.

When the rule was changed in 2002, the SEC, in its infinite wisdom, increased the amount at risk to be at least ten percent.

I marvel at the literal-minded robots who work at the SEC. Enron cobbled together the three percent outside equity – as the law required – but is there any doubt that Enron could have also found ten percent, or twenty, or fifty?

The Raptors absolutely conformed to the rules. The fact that the company collapsed gave investigators an opportunity to accuse not just people who worked there, but even the business structures that were in place to benefit all complex companies.

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Enron’s 1998 Annual Report

EnronAnnualReport1998

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Enron’s 2000 Annual Report

EnronAnnualReport2000

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Enron’s 1999 Annual Report

EnronAnnualReport1999

Sidebar: This image of Ken Rice and Joe Hirko was snatched from the Broadband section. One word: A-fucking-dorable.

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Victimless: The Intellectual Dishonesty of Prosecuting The Nigerian Barge Deal

Though I believe that all Enron defendants are innocent, it occurs to me that even if the Nigerian Barge defendants were guilty (and they’re not), it would be a victimless crime. Prosecutors made the argument in other Enron cases that the defendants were guilty because they inflated the value of the stock and lied to shareholders, etc. All those usual indignant screeds from people growing fat on the government dollar. But even if the prosecutors were one hundred percent truthful about the Nigerian Barges, who would be hurt?

The theory goes thusly: Andy Fastow and several of his people in Global Finance snookered Merrill Lynch into buying their minority interest in the Nigerian Barges so that Enron could book $12 million in profits, and thus enhance their quarterly earnings statement. In exchange, the Merrill Lynch bankers demanded (or Enron offered, depending on who you ask) that Enron would buy back the barges in six months.

Even if it was all true, so what? The twelve million dollars didn’t matter at all. For perspective, let us remember that it was during this same time that Rebecca Mark was spending money like a teenage Arab in Azurix. When the Argentinian water system was privatized, she bid $438.6 million for the company. The next highest bid was $150 million. Enron had money to waste, in other words. But wait, that’s not the cool part. The cool part is that Azurix informed its investors that it would miss the fourth quarter 1999 targets. It wasn’t great news – Azurix stock dropped 40% – but it didn’t spell financial ruin for Azurix.

Secondly, that same quarter, EnronOnline came online and was an immediate, huge moneymaker. There was no cash shortage in 1999.

Enron Energy Services signed contracts worth $8.5 billion, more than double the previous year’s $3.8 billion. The pipeline operation had earnings of $380 million. Portland General brought in $310 million. Money was coming in as fast as they could count it.

So why would anyone care about a teensy tiny $12 million deal that if he had wanted to, Jeff Skilling could have simply written a check for? $12 million literally was a rounding error. There was absolutely no fraud in this transaction.

Do you honestly believe that if Enron reported $12 million less on a net income of $830 million, that analysts would have thrown up their hands, sunk to their knees and implored, Why, God, why?! No. Such a scenario defies common sense. If Enron was somehow $12 million short of its earning targets, it seems to me that the stock would not have wavered much at all. Shareholders likely would not have cared. Enron brass would have been chagrined but would probably not spend a lot of time dwelling on it. But if Andy Fastow conspired with several in his own group and ML to fudge a $12 million lie, ultimately, what would it matter? Who would be hurt by that? (Forget the fact that it’s unethical.) Would shareholders be hurt? By supposedly lying, shareholder value increased slightly or remained steady.

Allegations against Corporate, NatWest, and Broadband at least make some kind of theoretical sense to me. If Broadband had blatantly lied about its abilities and numbers, then the shareholders were making decisions based on those lies and yes, there might have been a grave impact. Thank heavens that didn’t happen. But even if every word of the Nigerian Barge indictment is true, so what? $12 million is not enough to even register. It would be like you getting ready to leave for work and grabbing a pad of Post-Its to use at home. Are we really expected to believe that a huge company with billions of dollars in assets, a thriving new Broadband business, massive steady income from pipelines, and holdings from all over the globe, and the ability to let Rebecca Mark throw away over a hundred million dollars on a “mistake” really depended on the tiny $12 million Nigerian Barge deal?

Not only there was nothing wrong with the Nigerian Barge deal, the prosecutors are so lacking in imagination that this is the best they could come up with: a scam in which even if it were true, nobody would get hurt. I respect my own intelligence, and yours, too much to even entertain such an idea.

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John Kroger As Attorney General: Tyrant Untethered

I received an email a few days ago (which I still need to respond to!) about John Kroger, former Enron Task Force prosecutor and current Portland Attorney General. I think the author is discovering what I learned when Kroger indicted the EBS defendants: he is a power-hungry madman who needs to be stopped. He is reckless with the power bestowed upon him, using it to punish people who disagree with his worldview. I used to call him the Lesser Prosecutor because he was constantly whining about wanting more power, needing to flex his power, blah blah blah. Well, he flexed his power over the Enron defendants, and now he’s flexing his power over the people of Oregon.

I thought I would post the note here:

The guy moves to Oregon to teach law, writes his book telling what a fabulous lawyer he was in another state, decides to run for office, wins (!?), and demonstrates himself to be one of the most hyperpolitical AG’s we’ve ever had. I mean, he INFUSES his office with politics.

A) His aim is to beef up his investigation of environmental crime. That’s right, go after companies that commit environmental crimes. That’s his priority. We are a hub of child prostitution and we’ve got Mexican drug cartels carving up the national forests to put in their marijuana grows. Does he go after them? Oh, no!

B) One of his first hires to beef up his environmental agenda is the head of a far left environmentalist group. He was on the record as being against Liquified Natural Gas and, in fact, was lawyering on behalf of his environmental group against it. Kroger got the governor to give the lawyer an ethics waiver. Together they have been running a political campaign against LNG out of the AG’s office. When a little lady who runs a blog in the middle of nowhere found out about the waiver and everything else she put out the story. The lawyer was gone and Kroger has been hiding.

C) Portland’s mayor admits having sex with an 18 year old teenager, but had been grooming him for months before (if not having sex). The Mayor’s attorney pays a late night call (11pm) to the teen and, over a period of hours, coerces the kid into signing an affidavit which says they didn’t have sex before he turned 18. Kroger cites difference between the document and the real story the kid tells the media as the reason he can’t bring charges against the pervert. The lawyer later loses a judgeship, which was surely his before this incident, because of the unethical nature of getting that affidavit. The “ethics” of the document is never commented upon by Kroger. He will investigate the far left, gay, pedophile mayor no further. A recall of the mayor fails due to their being no charges. The mayor doesn’t have class enough to resign. Odd, isn’t it, that a guy who will seek out wrong doing or supposed wrong doing by any other party–especially evil polluters–isn’t the least bit curious about the back story and rights of a teenager predated upon and wronged by a mayor?

D) Attends a rally by SEIU in favor of government health care. It just seems odd that a guy who’s the top law enforcement officer chooses to spend his time politically advocating for socialized medicine. His right, but just the same, odd.

E) When 20 + other AG’s decide to fight Obamacare due to the unfunded state medicaid mandates, 10th amendment concerns, individual mandate I ask Kroger if he’ll join. Instead, he issues a press release saying he thinks socialized medicine is such a great idea, he’ll use taxpayer funds to write an amicus brief in favor. Even when his side gets its way Kroger has to go in for the political kill.

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Andy Fastow Moved Again

Andy Fastow was moved (again) from Colorado to Louisiana. I don’t know why yet. I’m curious about the move because according to his original timeline, he would have been moved to a halfway house by now. Since he was taken out of RDAP, that timeline doesn’t work anymore.

A few people I’ve spoken to about prison assure me that the BOP is first and foremost lazy, and secondly cruel. So whatever the reason behind the move, we can be assured it wasn’t because anything Andy requested.

UPDATE – 6/27/10

I received an email from someone who would know what’s up with Andy. This is what it said:

In all likelihood he was moved to Colorado so he could participate in RDAP since they don’t have a program at Oakdale or at Pollock. Since he was yanked from the program, they probably moved him to make room for another person to attend the RDAP at Florence. There is an obligation on the part of the BoP to try to keep inmates within 500 miles of their home, so that is why they probably moved him back to Louisiana. Why they didn’t move him to Beaumont or Bastrop? Who knows… there was probably available space at Pollock. It also seems that the BoP has it in for certain prisoners and I’m sure Andy falls into that category. They have likely concluded he did not get appropriately punished by the judge, so they will make his life as miserable as possible. Pollock is 250 miles away vs 200 to Oakdale vs 75 to Beaumont (and Beaumont is a much larger camp).

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EBS’s Official Notice To Blockbuster That Blockbuster Has Violated Agreement

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