[Retro RTG]
This one is especially wrenching for me because it’s so close to home. I cross the 14th Street Bridge every day. I sometimes try to seek out a mark on the old stones, something to show that a disaster happened there. But there is nothing, not a trace of the accident that happened on that long-ago day.
The citizens of Washington DC woke up on the morning of January 13, 1982 to find themselves gripped in a blizzard. Twenty five inches of snow covered the ground and was expected to continue through the day. The government – including Congress and schools – were closed to business. Even National Airport had been closed all morning but reopened at noon. It closed again at 1:30 so crews could sweep the runways of snow and ice. The airport reopened again at 2:30.
While the crews cleared the runway, Air Florida flight 90 (given the name Palm 90 at the tower) at Gate B12 began to board. Captain Larry Wheaton and First Officer Roger Pettitwere both relatively young pilots and new recruits to Air Florida. They were buttoned up in the aircraft, de-icing the aircraft when the tower informed them there would be further delay. Wheaton requested the de-icing be stopped.
At 3:00, Wheaton instructed de-icing to continue, and the job was done by 3:10. Due to the accumulation of snow, however, the ground services motor tow couldn’t get traction. After a little wrangling, the airplane finally pushed back and went to wait for 49 minutes on the taxiway behind 11 other aircraft.
For reasons that baffled the air crash investigators later, the following conversation took place during the takeoff checklist:
Captain: Air condition and pressurization?
First Officer: Set.
Captain: Engine and anti-ice?
First Officer: Off.
The anti-ice system uses heat from the engines to prevent sensors from freezing and providing inaccurate readings. On this bitterly cold, icy, snowy day the captain apparently wanted it off?
The result was exactly what it was expected to be: the Engine Pressure Ratio thrust indicators reflected false high readings. When the pilots believed they hard throttled up to the correct EPR of 2.04, the actual EPR was only 1.70. The first indication that something was wrong was that the aircraft traveled nearly 1/2 mile further down the runway than is customary before liftoff was achieved. One survivor of the crash reported that he feared the airplane would not get airborne and would “fall off the end of the runway.”
Pettit, the First Officer, knew that something was wrong even as they were rolling for take off but Wheaton was sure that everything was in order:
Captain: It’s spooled. Real cold, real cold.
First Officer: God, look at that thing. That don’t seem right, does it? Uh, that’s not right.
Captain: Yes it is, there’s eighty.
First Officer: Naw, I don’t think that’s right. Ah, maybe it is.
Captain: Hundred and twenty.
First Officer: I don’t know.
Captain: Vee-one. Easy, vee-two.
The aircraft did get airborne though. It pitched sharply up, causing Wheaton to say, “Easy.” As a professional pilot, he had to know that ice buildup on the wings of a 737 could cause the nose to pitch up. Pettit began to correct the pitch problem. At this point the aircraft achieved its maximum height of 337 feet, where it was airborne for 30 seconds. Almost as soon as they left the runway, the stickshaker began to sound. We pick up the CVR at the moment the flight is airborne.
Tower: Palm 90 contact departure control.
Captain: Forward, forward, easy. We only want five hundred. [The captain is referringto the altitude at which the airplane had to be to make the 40 degree turn to the left around the Washington Monument and the restricted airspace over the Capitol.]
Captain: Come on forward….forward, just barely climb. [The aircraft is already stalling.]
Captain: Stalling, we’re falling!
First Office: Larry, we’re going down, Larry….
Captain: I know it.
[SOUND OF IMPACT]
End of Tape.
At 4:01pm, the aircraft crashed into the 14th Street Bridge, less than a mile from the end of the runway. The aircraft hit six cars and a truck on the bridge, tore away 20 feet of guardrail, and plummeted into the frozen Potomac. Four of the five crew and 69 of the 74 passengers perished. Four motorists on the bridge also died and four more were injured.
The audio of the CVR is available on the internet here. Of course, it is extremely disturbing and will take something out of you to hear it. But it is there, if you want it.
3 Comments
April 23, 2008 at 3:42 pm
Oh how I remember this. I’ve always been so angry at the captain for not listening to the FO, and for the FO to be intimidated by him. It was a completely preventable tragedy that I’ve always kept in the back of my mind when I fly. If something doesn’t look or feel right, to either me or anyone else in the cockpit, I always step back and re-evaluate. Most times it turns out to be nothing, but every now and then…
I know what you mean about going out to the bridge and looking. When I was stationed in Korea, we had an aircraft shelter that an F4 crashed into long before I got there. I would spend many hours out there, just thinking and looking for something, anything to remind me of the terrible loss. I spent many years after that on recovery crews and each site is still burned into my mind.
April 23, 2008 at 4:47 pm
R1, this is one of those cases that makes me grit my teeth every time I board a commercial plane. It was SO FREAKING OBVIOUS, even to a novice like myself, that you have to de-ice the flippin’ plane! I can not, for the life of me, figure out why the Captain didn’t turn to the FO and say, “Whatchu talkin’ bout, Willis?” Between the two of them, you would think this huge, major issue would have been caught.
Isn’t it strange, how we approach these sites, looking for something. I don’t know why I do it, but I do.
April 23, 2008 at 5:40 pm
I know! That’s one of the main reasons they HAVE more than one pilot, to double check and rely on, no, trust each other to keep everyone safe. I wish I had a dollar for every time I’ve run across pilots like this. They are the captain. They know everything there is to know. They are there to show the FO’s just how gutsy, smart, talented they are in the air. Sit there and shut up, I’ve flown more hours than most birds, I know what is and what isn’t right. GRRRRRRrrrrrrrrrrrrrr!
Anyway, I so know what you mean about going to these sites. Something just draws me to them. It’s not morbidity, or even curiosity; it’s almost a force.